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I. INTRODUCTION

With its explosion across America's litigation landscape, expert
witnessing has become a foundation for decision-making in virtually all
significant cases. Described by some courts as a "cottage industry,"' it has
also become more lucrative than the usual day job for many professionals.
With litigants and their counsel shopping relentlessly for key specialists,2
and the experts themselves pursuing engagements aggressively,3 the
growth of expert consultations has spawned a proliferation of allegations
concerning conflicts of interest. But expert conflicts of interest are not
governed by specific procedural rules.4 Nor is there, in general, specific
guidance to be found in the ethical criteria of that expert's own profession.5
As a result, to address conflicts of interest for expert witnesses and
consultants, federal courts have developed a distinctive jurisprudence that
is not anchored upon the explicit terms of procedural rules, ethical
strictures, or even Supreme Court precedent. Instead, a series of federal
lower court decisions have crafted an expert-disqualification doctrine
based upon a court's inherent authority to safeguard the integrity of the

1. Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 582 (D.N.J. 1994); see also Eymard v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Basic policy questions that affect
the very nature of a trial lie behind decisions to receive expert testimony."); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that juries are readily swayed by expert
testimony as a result of "its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness"); William S. Bailey,
Expert Witnesses in the Sound-Bite Era, TRIAL, Feb. 1993, at 65, 69 ("Winning or losing at trial
depends largely on the persuasiveness of experts ....
If you win the battle of the experts, you are
also likely to win the war.").
2. L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back To The Future, 29 U. RICH L. REV.
1389, 1415 (1995) ("[L]awyers shop for experts, ultimately choosing the one that talks right, looks
right, has the right credentials, and will work with the lawyer in the development of her opinions.").
3. See GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FORNONE 270 (1989) ("[Expert work] has become...
big business .... The swearing-for-hire business is immense and indispensable to nearly every
case."); see also Anthony Champagne et al., Expert Witnesses in the Courts: An Empircal
Examination, 76 JUDICATURE 5, 6-7 (1992); Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination
of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRIcs J. 193,
205 (1994) (average fee of $185.00 charged by expert witnesses).
4. In Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66 (D. Md. 1992), the district court observed that
"[n]othing in the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) precludes a party from retaining an expert
previously consulted by his opponent." Id. at 67 (citing Riley v. Dow Chem. Corp., 123 F.R.D. 639,
640 (N.D. Cal. 1989)); see also Proctor & Gamble v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410,411 (D. Utah 1999)
("The Rules of Civil Procedure do not create any privilege or basis for disqualification in this
case."). An earlier decision approached the issue recognizing that "there is virtually nothing in print
to guide my decision." Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984) ("This case presents
an issue beyond the explicit language of rule 26(b)(4)(B).").
5. According to one critic, "[iut is pointless to rely upon the professional ethics of experts,
even where such a code exists, because most such codes have no binding effect and are often
politely disregarded." Terry O'Reilly, Ethics and Experts, 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 113, 114 (1993).
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judicial process and maintain the public's confidence in the court system.
Although critical differences have subsequently emerged in the way courts
deploy this inherent authority, key features of the underlying doctrine are
still widely followed, despite the lack of procedural rules or extensive
appellate case law to direct these principles.6
This Article examines the doctrine for expert disqualification that has
evolved during the last fifteen years based upon inherent judicial
authority.7 Beginning with a review of the Supreme Court's inherent power
doctrine, the discussion turns to the origins of current disqualification
methodology. Next, following a review of the principal criteria employed
by the courts, analysis is undertaken of the substantive and procedural
issues that arise in disqualification controversies. Finally, this paper
concludes with observations concerning the current trends and future needs
in this increasingly important area.!
II. BACKGROUND: INHERENT AUTHORITY-THE SUPREME COURT
DOCTRINE

Inherent powers have been reposed in the federal courts since the early
nineteenth century. The premise of judicial authority to act, even without
an enabling statute or rule, was often predicated upon the necessity of
taking action to enforce court orders. To remedy acts of interference with
essential court functions, inherent authority was recognized as a basis to

6. While conflicts of interest based on prior services or contacts are not directly addressed
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, some expert scenarios can implicate violations of Rule 26.
See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 301-04 (9th Cir. 1996) (defense attorney's exparte
contact with plaintiff's expert witness, offering him employment in another case, constitutes witness
tampering, warranting new trial and disciplinary action against defense counsel); see also Campbell
Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24,26 (9th Cir. 1980) (expartecontact between opposing counsel
and designated trial expert warranted disqualification); Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 120
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (attorney contact with former employee did not violate Rule 4.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct which prohibits contact between counsel and represented parties,
including managerial personnel). Other Rule 26 controversies over the use of experts have
addressed the sufficiency of disclosures concerning the basis for opinions. See, e.g., Fitz, Inc. v.
Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 184 F.R.D. 532, 538 (D.N.J. 1999).
7. A related source of controversy is a litigant's attempt to subpoena for trial an expert
initially retained as a consultant by the adversary but not utilized for testimonial purposes. See
Rubel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (disallowing use of adversary's
consulting expert); see also Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (11 th Cir. 1996). Courts that
permit the use of the opponent's consulting expert often disallow efforts to exploit the earlier
engagement. Id.
8. For helpful discussions on several related ethical topics, see generally Audrey I. Benison,
The SophisticatedClient: A Proposalfor the Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standardsfor
Attorneys andAccountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 699 (2000); Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses:
Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465 (1999); Douglas R. Richmond, Expert
Witness Conflicts and Compensation,67 TENN. L. REV. 909 (2000),
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discipline attorneys,9 to require respectful and silent presence in the
courtroom,' 0 and to investigate, correct, and punish any fraud perpetrated
upon the court."
Thus, in Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 2 the Supreme Court approved the
judicial authority of a trial court to dismiss a case as a sanction for
egregious litigation abuses, stating:
The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and
to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts.
The power is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgments
3
of nonsuit and non prosequiturentered at common law.'
Applying that analysis, the Court's ensuing decisions continued a path of
selective validations of inherent power, including the assessment of fees
against parties acting "vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons," 4
for bad faith violations of court orders," and egregious abuse of the
litigation process.' 6
In 1991, the Court in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 7 applied the inherent
authority doctrine to sanction bad-faith misconduct by a litigant, finding
that "if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the
Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power."'"
In Chambers,a television station purchaser resisted an action for specific
performance 9 in which "his entire course of conduct throughout the
lawsuit evidenced bad faith and an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the
9. Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824).
10. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
11. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1945) ("The inherent
power of a federal court to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud, is beyond
question.").
12. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
13. Id. at 629-30 (citing 3 WILiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *295-96); see also id. at
630 ("The authority... to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered
an 'inherent power' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts
to manage their own affairs .... ").
14. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-60 (1975).
15. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,695-96 (1979) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment
does not prevent an award of attorney's fees against state functionaries who act in bad faith in
failing to cure constitutional violations in a state prison due to "inherent authority of the Court in
the orderly administration ofjustice") (quoting Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70,
74(1927)).
16. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,764 (1980) ("Because inherent powers are
shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.").
17. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
18. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 36.
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court., 21 In holding that inherent authority can operate without the
permission of rules or statutes, the Court observed that, "'Courts ofjustice
are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
powers to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, and
submission to their lawful mandates." ' ' 2' Finding that, because of "their
very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with strength and
discretion,, 22 the Court held that the availability of rules and procedural
statutes did not displace inherent power to impose sanctions for "bad faith
conduct ... [because] ... the inherent power extends to a full range of
litigation abuses. ' 23 Therefore, even in settings where statutory criteria may
generally apply, inherent authority is not preempted and, in any event, that
authority "must continue to exist to fill in the interstices. '"4
Five years later, in Degan v. UnitedStates, 25 the Court underscored the
limits to the power: "The extent of these powers must be delimited with
care, for there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the
Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others,
undertakes to define its own authority. ' 26 Thus, while recognizing that an
overseas fugitive should not utilize his absence to resist the government's
efforts to forfeit targeted assets, 27 the Court reversed a default judgment
imposed pursuant to the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. 2' By virtue ofthe
existence of alternative means for protecting the government's interests,29
the Court rejected absolute disentitlement.3" Manifesting a philosophical
recognition that, when the judicial branch "undertakes to define its own
authority," self restraint is an imperative, 3' the Court found that judicial
remedies must be confined to those measures reasonably necessary to
address the abuse. "Principles of deference counsel restraint in resorting to
inherent power and require its use to be a reasonable response to the
problems and needs that provoke it."32 In the wake of these Supreme Court
20. Id. at 50-51.
21. Id. at 43 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
22. Id. at 44.
23. Id. at 46.
24. Id.
25. 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
26. Id. at 823.
27. Id. at 827.
28. Id. at 829.
29. Id. at 827 ("A federal court has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders,
including dismissal in an appropriate case.").
30. Id. at 829. The Court's reluctance was not fueled by any sympathy for a fugitive from
justice. Id. at 828 ("[W]e acknowledge disquiet at the spectacle of a criminal defendant reposing
in Switzerland, beyond the reach of our criminal courts, while at the same time, mailing papers to
the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be honored.").
31. Id. at823.
32. Id. at 823-24 (internal citation omitted).
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holdings, circuit courts have applied inherent power with circumspection.
Following Chambers, most circuits have concluded that a finding of bad
faith is a prerequisite to a district court imposing sanctions pursuant to its
inherent power. 3 Even before the Supreme Court amplified the need to
examine alternative remedies in imposing inherent authority, circuit courts
typically explored the viability of lesser punishments before exercising
"inherent power sanctions that are fundamentally penal.

'34

Thus, while

inherent authority has evolved over almost two centuries as a permanent
dimension of the judicial tapestry, it is a fabric threaded with caution.
III.

BACKGROUND: EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PARALLELS

Before expert disqualification found footings in inherent authority,
analogies to the attorney-client privilege dominated the field. 3 In Conforti
& Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Building & Construction, Department of
Treasury,36 the Superior Court of New Jersey issued a conflict-based
disqualification of an expert through an extension of the attorney-client
privilege based on state law." In that case, an expert who had previously
worked on behalf of a state agency in an earlier phase of a construction
dispute attempted afterwards to relocate his allegiance to the state's
adversary concerning a later stage of the project. 3' Because the expert had
worked for the state agency's counsel in a prior, related litigation, the court
found that the expert, as counsel's former agent, was enveloped by the
attorney-client privilege. 39 Relying upon the principle that attorneys have
a duty to prevent the disclosure of any attorney-client confidences that

33. Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co. (In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig.), 78 F.3d 431(9th Cir.
1996); Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995); Shimman v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984). But see United States v. Seltzer 227 F.3d 36, 39-42 (2d
Cir. 2000) (specific finding of bad faith is not a precondition to exercise of inherent power to police
the conduct of attorneys); Carroll v. Jaques, 926 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
34. Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
35. Traditionally, courts have tackled these issues amidst "a paucity of case law on the subject
of disqualifying expert witnesses when conflicts of interest arise." Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334, 336 (N.D. Ill.
1990); see also In re Ambassador Group,
Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
36. 405 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
37. Id. at 491. To the extent that privilege questions arise in disqualification scenarios, those
issues are governed by state law. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Compare Tucker v. John R. Steele &
Assocs., Inc., No. 93 C 1268, 1994 WL 127246, at *2 (N.D. Il. Apr. 12, 1994) (adopting and
applying state law for substantive physician-patient privilege rules), with Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins,
774 A.2d 1209, 1216 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (recognizing no common law or statutory
physician-patient privilege in Maryland).
38. Conforti & Eisele, Inc., 405 A.2d at 489-90.
39. Id. at 490.
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would be known to the expert, the court issued an injunction against the
expert's participation in litigation against his former client.4 °
Anchored upon the foundation of attorney-client privilege, the court in
Conforti concluded that, "[i]t would be anomalous to hold that the State
could claim the privilege as against its attorneys, yet have that privilege
dissolve when their attorneys properly confide their client's
communication to someone in their employ."' 41 Pinpointing a concern that
would continue to resonate in subsequent decisions, the New Jersey court
emphasized the expert's access to the "mental impressions, opinions[,] and
' Because the court found that the
legal theories of the State's counsel."42
earlier exposure to this information could not be erased, the Conforticourt
reasoned that if the expert were allowed to work for the opposing party,
that confidential information would "shape or effect, either consciously or
unconsciously," the analysis provided to the second litigant. 43 Especially
because this scenario would give the second litigant information through
indirect means, which it was not entitled to obtain directly through
discovery, the conflict would create an untenable situation for which "[n]o
form of protection order could be truly effective in expunging this
knowledge., 44 As a result, the only perceived option was to preclude the
second litigant from employing the expert.45
A federal district court largely accepted the analysis of Conforti when
it granted a disqualification motion in Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v.
Norton Co.46 In that case, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's attempt
to use a sealant expert who had previously enjoyed a long-term relationship
with the plaintiff, including extensive development work and access to
sensitive product design information. 4' Although not attempting to switch
sides in the same case, the sealant expert had participated in a prior,
unrelated case for the same party it was later seeking to oppose.48
40. In addition to the attorney-client privilege, the court also relied upon a state law that
protects former employers from attempted disclosures of trade secrets and confidential information
by former employees. See id. at 491-92. The court noted that "there is also a policy which is
designed to protect employers against improper disclosures of information which their employees
have received in confidence." Id. at 491 (quoting Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 108 A.2d 442, 447
(N.J. 1954)).
Finding that "[t]he law will imply a relationship of confidence when it is just to do so," the
court emphasized that the engineering expert was "privy to confidential documents regarding the
legal aspects of the State's claims." Id. at 492.
41. Id. at 491.
42. Id. at 492.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 113 F.R.D. 588, 590 (D. Minn. 1986).
47. Id. at 590-91.
48. Id. at 591.
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In determining the disqualification issues, both parties appeared to
agree upon the legal test, thus effectively stipulating that if the expert had
been engaged in matters relevant to the same litigation, disqualification
would be appropriate.49 The court also embraced that analysis, finding that
with experts, like attorneys, disqualification is conceived to protect against
the potential breach of confidences, "even without any predicate showing
of actual breach."5 Thus, the court, applying attorney-client privilege
criteria, stated that disqualification when "the matters involved in the
pending suit are substantially related to the matters or cause of action" in
the prior engagement, the expert will be disqualified.5 '
IV. EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION: PAUL V. RAWLINGS
SPORTING GOODS Co.

While some decisions would continue to rely on the attorney-client
analogy of Conforti and Marvin Lumber,52 in 1988 a United States
magistratejudge's opinion transformed expert-disqualification analysis and
marked a new path that would be followed into the next millennium. 3 In
Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.,54 the court confronted a productliability case where a Rawlings baseball helmet allegedly failed to protect
an amateur player who suffered severe brain damage after being struck on
the head by a pitched baseball.55 Early in the case, defense counsel retained
a leading engineering expert to perform a series of tests on baseball

49. Id. at 590-91 (adopting and applying the reasoning of Conforti & Eisele, Inc., 405 A.2d
at 491-92).
50. Id. at 591. Conforti had premised disqualification upon its determination that the expert
constituted counsel's agent, thereby summoning attorney-ethical criteria. 405 A.2d at 489-90.
However, the court in Marvin Lumber largely assumed the applicability of those disqualification
criteria without determining whether the attorney-client privilege was directly at issue. See Marvin
Lumber & CedarCo., 113 F.R.D. at 591.
51. Marvin Lumber & CedarCo., 113 F.R.D. at 591.
52. See, e.g., Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 8898
(MEC), 1989 WL 31514, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989). An analogous thesis of disqualifications
was applied in Miles v.,
Farrell,549 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ill.
1982), based on state law regarding
doctor-patient privilege. In Miles, plaintiffs treating physician was prohibited from serving as
defendant's expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Id.at 85. Strikingly, after accepting the
engagement on behalf of the defendant, the expert treated the plaintiffwithout informing him of the
adverse relationship, assertedly through inadvertence. Compare id. at 84, with Tucker v. John R.
Steele & Assocs., Inc., No. 93 C. 1268, 1994 WL 127246 (N.D. I11. Apr. 12, 1994) (permitting
treating veterinarian to serve as expert witness for defendant veterinarian, because in veterinary
malpractice cases, state law confers no privilege).
53. Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L. REV. 485, 562 (1997)
("As a matter of policy, courts must balance competing objectives, an approach first announced in
Paulv. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.").
54. 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
55. Id. at 273.
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helmets.56 While there was some dispute as to whether the Paul litigation
was specifically within the scope of that retention, there were clearly
discussions between expert and defense counsel about the testing of
helmets during meetings that lasted over an hour."
In the course of these communications, the expert provided sufficient
information to indicate that he might not be a helpful witness for the
defense, and further exchanges with Rawlings ceased."8 Seven months
later, that same expert was contacted by the plaintiff's attorney who sent
him extensive information along with the requested $1,000.00 retainer.5 9
After the expert prepared a report finding that the Rawlings helmet did not
adequately protect the wearer against a wild pitch, Rawlings moved for
disqualification.60
In considering the motion, the court's threshold inquiry was whether,
"under any set of circumstances," the court had authority to disqualify an
expert witness.6 Assessing Conforti,the court in Paul concluded that the
New Jersey decision was premised upon state law protections against the
disclosure of attorney-client confidences.62 Rather than follow Conforti's
modality, though, the federal court turned to a separate source of authority
and found that it possessed the "inherent power to preserve the public
confidence in the fairness and integrity of ...judicial proceedings."63
Strikingly, in concluding that judicial powers inherently encompassed the
prerogative of expert disqualification, the court did not refer to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence limiting inherent authority as a basis for
sanctioning disobedience to court orders. 6' Indeed, in Paul,as in later cases
applying Paul's expert-disqualification doctrine, there was no indication
that the engagement by plaintiff of the expert, months after the defendant's
consultation with that expert, violated any order of the court.65 Moreover,
in general, when a prior consulting expert for one side later attempts to
serve as a consultant or trial expert for a second side, there is no violation
of Rule 26 or any other provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.66
Nor did Paul find direction from any code of expert ethical criteria.67 In

56. Id. at 273-74.
57. Id. at 274-75.
58. Id. at 275.
59. Id. at 276.
60. Id. at 273.
61. Id. at 272-77.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 278.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C 6157, 2002 WL 653893
(N.D. III. Apr. 19, 2002).
66. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999).
67. See Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 281.
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contrast to attorneys, helmet experts, like most other professionals, are not
subject to any detailed criteria that define when conflicting representations
create a disqualifying impropriety.68
While standing in a field of limited judicial precedent 69 without
footings in Supreme Court doctrine, procedural rules, or specific ethical
criteria, the Paul court nevertheless fashioned a test for expert
disqualification that relied upon general tenets of inherent authority.7 ° In
designing the mechanics for implementing this authority, the court
identified three questions. 7' First, did the first party and the expert enter
into a relationship that gave rise to an objectively reasonable expectation72
that the first party could impart confidential information to the expert?
The next inquiry centered upon whether the first litigant did, in fact,
disclose confidential information to that expert. 73 The third question was
whether the expert used or might use such information to the first litigant's
disadvantage.74
In the event that all such questions were answered affirmatively, the
court would then turn to ascertaining the appropriate remedy.75 From these
questions, a two-part test was distilled: "[F]irst, whether the attorney or
client acted reasonably in assuming that a confidential or fiduciary
relationship of some sort existed and if so, whether the relationship
developed into a matter sufficiently substantial to make disqualification or
some other judicial remedy appropriate. ' 76 Applying this two-part test to
the helmet expert in Paul,the court rejected disqualification, finding that
the first part of the test was likely met but that the second standard was not
satisfied because "the parties never communicated on matters of particular
substance relating to the Michael Paul case ' 77 in the course of the first
engagement. As a result, the78court found no evidence that the plaintiff had
been "unduly advantaged.

68. See id.
69. Even after Paul,courts have continued to recognize that the case law available on these
issues is very limited. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); Sells v. Wamser, 158 F.R.D. 390, 392 (S.D. Ohio 1994); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden
Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that cases on this topic are "rare");
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334, 336 (N.D. Il.1990)
(noting the "paucity" of precedent for these issues).
70. Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 278.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 279.
78. Id.at 280.
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In emphasizing the lack of "demonstrable prejudice to Rawlings,"79 the
court unmistakably articulated an actual-prejudice standard that did not
presume that confidential communications were imparted solely by virtue
of the prior relationship between an expert and client.80 By discarding the
presumption that ordinarily prevails in an attorney-client scenario,"' the
court distinguished attorneys from experts and, effectively, rejected the2
analogy that was central to the analyses in Conforti and Marvin Lumber.1
Summarizing the attorney-client criteria, the court explained that once a
confidential relationship is established, confidential communications are
presumed for at least two reasons:
First, it eliminates the need for the client to demonstrate that
potentially prejudicial information passed between him and
his attorney by testifying to such information, which, of
course, would then defeat the claim of privilege. It also is
designed to preserve the public trust in the integrity of the
judicial system by preventing an attorney from engaging in
the unseemly practice of representing different parties to the
same litigation at different times. 3
In holding that expert disqualification would not mirror the criteria of
attorney-conflict analysis, the court stressed several key distinctions." The
court found concerns that govern attorney conflict of interest cases less
persuasive for experts,
because there are many communications between a client and
expert witness which are not privileged, and because there is
less stigma attached to an expert "changing sides" in the
midst of litigation than an attorney, who occupies a position
of higher trust, with concomitant fiduciary duties, to a client
than does an expert consultant.8 5
As a result, rather than applying attorney ethical criteria that safeguard
against even the potential for harmful impropriety, Paulespoused practical

79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 280-81.
82. See id. at 281.
83. Id. Thus, under the substantial-relationship test, attorneys are disqualified when there is
a clear relationship between issues in prior and present cases. Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc.,
569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978); see also In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 614-16 (5th
Cir. 1992) (disqualifying counsel where prior representation has substantial relationship to current
adverse position).
84. Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 280.
85. Id.at281.
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considerations concerning a reasonable belief in a confidential relationship
and a fact-based determination of whether any demonstrable prejudice8 is
6
suffered by the first party when a second party retains the same expert.
Recognizing that expert consultations, especially initial encounters,
may create uncertainty over the present status of retention and future
expectations of confidentiality, the court determined that "a formal, written
contract establishing both the existence of the relationship and prohibiting
the disclosure of any information gained by the expert" from the first
litigant was preferable, but was not an absolute precondition to
disqualification. In the event that no such agreements are confirmed in
writing, the court suggested that any ambiguities in the relationship
between an expert and retaining counsel should be construed against the
attorney:
Of the two participants in an attorney-expert relationship,
however, the attorney, being an expert in legal matters, should
be more aware of both the potential for privileged information
to pass to the expert, and for the need to insure against such
information finding its way into the hands of an adversary.88
As a result, the court concluded that the burden of ensuring that the expert
understands the confidential, privileged nature of the relationship should
fall upon counsel.8 9
In balancing the competing policy objectives, the court also expressed
a concern that the first party's preliminary consultations might be unfairly
exploited as a tool for disqualifying experts that a second party might
legitimately need to present its case. 90 In the Paulscenario, the court noted
that the challenged expert had published extensively in the area and
appeared more logically to be a plaintiffs expert than a voice for
defendants in like cases. 9' Without attributing bad motive to either side, the
court nevertheless emphasized that
if experts are too easily the subject of motions to disqualify,
unscrupulous attorneys or clients will be encouraged to
engage in a race for expert witnesses, and to identify
potentially harmful experts and to create some type of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 281.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss1/3

12

Coffey: Inherent Judicial Authority and the Expert Disqualification Doctr

20041

INHERENT JUDICIAL AUTHORInT AND THE F"ERTDISQUAUFICATION DOCTRINE

207

inexpensive relationship with those experts, simply in order
to keep them away from the other side."
Misgivings about possible manipulation of the disqualification process
would be a recurring theme in later cases, especially in highly specialized
areas with a limited menu of truly qualified potential experts.93
V. EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION: PAUL'S Two-PART TEST IN
THE LOWER COURTS

Two years later, Paul'stwo-part test was adopted by the district court
in GreatLakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. HarnischfegerCorp.94 In that case,
the plaintiff requested disqualification of an opposing expert firm which
employed a metallurgist that the plaintiff had previously consulted
concerning a mechanical failure in a mining barge. 9" The court found,
however, no informational connection between the two concerning the
matter at issue.96 Moreover, because the parties and their attorneys were
aware of the relationship between the experts, the court found that they
would be "in a position to prevent any improper disclosures in the
future." 97 Recognizing the right of a litigant to choose its own expert, and
the value of employment from the expert's standpoint, the court
underscored the realities of expert services:
It is also not unusual for opposing experts in narrow fields of
specialty to have had exposure to each other[']s work and
theories or even to have worked together in the past. This is
a fact of life where there is a limited number of experts in a
given field, or limited experts with experience in a particular
type of case.9"
Thus, the court distinguished the circumstances of experts with a prior
affiliation to an opposing party from the scenario of side-switching within
the same case-a distinction, as this doctrine has evolved, which often
proves to be critical. 99

92. Id
93. See infra discussion in Parts V & VI.
1990). According to the plaintiff, the conflict was
94. 734 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. I11.
compounded by the fact that defendant's expert had often supervised plaintiff's metallurgist during
other professional assignments. Id at 335.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 338.
97. Id. at 339.
98. Id.
99. See id.
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One year later, another federal court cited Paul and Great Lakes to
disqualify an expert based upon the now crystallized two-step inquiry
concerning the confidentiality of the relationship and the information
exposed to the expert. In Wang Laboratories,Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 00 the
court enforced its inherent authority in accordance with the Paulcriteria to
impose disqualification in a case of side-switching by a patent expert. 01
Thus, the court described as "a clear case for disqualification" those
scenarios where a consultant retained by one party becomes an expert for
the opposing party after receiving confidential information."2 To decide
expert conflict of interest cases, the court phrased the two-part analysis of
Pauland Great Lakes in oft-quoted terms:0 3
First, was it objectively reasonable for the first party who
claims to have retained the consultant, in this case Scott on
behalf of Wang, to conclude that a confidential relationship
existed?
Second, was any confidential or privileged information
disclosed by the first party to the consultant?... Affirmative
answers to both inquiries compels disqualification.0 4
Although, as in Paul and Great Lakes, the court required a showing that
confidential information was actually shared with the challenged expert,
no measurement of these confidences was required in Wang. Instead, the
court focused upon the nature, rather than the quantum of confidential
communications, stating that, "[w]hile the value of the disclosures is
debatable, their essential work-product nature is not. No experienced
litigator would freely disclose these materials to opposing counsel.' 0 5

100. 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991).
101. Id.at 1248. The facts of Wang were clearly more troubling than the circumstances of Paul
or Great Lakes. Wang's attorney had contacted a computer consultant and provided him with
lengthy, detailed materials prepared by counsel about the litigation issues. Id. at 1247. While the
expert ultimately informed counsel that he thought the patents were invalid and he was not
interested in serving as Wang's consultant, the consultant nevertheless submitted a $1,540.00
invoice for his time. Id.Five months later, without informing Wang or its counsel, that same expert
surfaced as the defense expert for the opposing party on patent-validity issues. Id.
102. See id. at 1248.
103. See, e.g., Popular Inc. v. Popular Staffing Servs., Corp., 239 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D.P.R.
2003); Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
104. Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1248 (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 1249. As with later cases that would grant disqualification, the Wang court did not
find that any party acted improperly and, in granting disqualifications, the court offered suggestions
to prevent misunderstandings in the future. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
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VI. EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION: THE BALANCING TEST
In 1994, the court in Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co.' 06 added a third
component to the prevailing two-part test. 10 7 In addition to the dual
components of confidential relationships and confidential information, the
court in Cordy found it appropriate to "balance the competing policy
objectives in determining expert disqualification."'' 8
In describing the objectives to be weighed, the court began with the
duty to maintain the integrity of the judicial process that could otherwise
be compromised by serious conflicts of interest.0 9 Additional factors
included the need to ensure that litigants have access to expert witnesses
and their specialized knowledge, the right of experts to pursue their
professional calling, and the frequently stated concern that if experts
become too easily subject to disqualification, unscrupulous litigants may
attempt to create an inexpensive relationship with potentially harmful
experts solely to make them inaccessible to their adversary.' After a
review of multiple factors and focusing upon the expert's exposure to
confidential information, including the first litigant's "trial strategy,"'' . the
court disqualified not only the expert, but the law firm that collaborated
with the expert in his second employment. "2 Following Cordy's addition
of a balancing test to the original two elements, a number of decisions have
included this third tier as an additional component of disqualification
analysis." 3
With the expert-disqualification doctrine enjoying increasing support
among federal districtjudges,' 14 further validation for Pauland its progeny
106. 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.N.J. 1994).
107. Id. at 580.
108. Id. In developing this third component, the court referred to the discussion in Paulabout
competing policy interests. Id. Although the considerations discussed in Pauland other cases have
underscored the distinction between expert disqualification and attorney-client analysis, prior to
Cordy,courts have not articulated this balancing test as a third prong of the expert-disqualification
determination.
109. Id.
I10. Id.
Ill. Id. at 584.
112. Id. Although a rare outcome, Cordy is not the only decision in which an expert's taint
caused an infection warranting the removal of counsel. See, e.g., B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo,
Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780, A096583, 2002 WL 31628763 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002).
113. See, e.g., Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181-83 (5th Cir.
1996); Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Proctor& Gamble
Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D. Utah 1999); Space Sys./Loral v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
Civ. No. 95-20122 SW, 1995 WL 686369, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995); English Feedlot, Inc.
v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1504-06 (D. Colo. 1993).
114. See Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 8898 (MEC),
1989 WL 31514, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989) (granting disqualification of securities expert,
citing Marvin Lumber); see also United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1013,
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followed in state appellate decisions in Colorado," 5 Connecticut," 16 and
New York."i7 In 1996, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed the Paul
"8 asuit
and Cordy test in Koch Refining Co. v. JenniferL. Boudreaux,MV,
over a cargo-laden barge that sank amidst heavy seas.'9 Upon ascertaining
sufficient support for the lower court's findings concerning the confidential
relationship and confidential information, 2 ' the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that some lower courts further analyzed the public interest
and thereupon conducted its own balancing of policy objectives with
respect to expert disqualification,"' including:
[e]nsuring that parties have access to expert witnesses who
possess specialized knowledge and allowing experts to pursue
their professional calling .... [C]oncern that if experts are

too easily subjected to disqualification, unscrupulous
attorneys and clients may attempt to create an inexpensive
relationship with potentially harmful experts solely to keep
them from the opposing party ....[W]hether another expert
is available and whether22the opposing party had time to hire
him or her before trial.
After reviewing the elements of the two-part test and balancing the public
interest factors, the Koch court found that the lower court had not abused
the expert "under this very limited and
its discretion in disqualifying
23
specific factual scenario."
This acceptance of the expert-disqualification doctrine by the Fifth
Circuit, adoption by state courts 24 and, in 1999, adoption in the Federal

1016 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (citing Marvin Lumber while declining to resolve which standard was
proper); Vikase Corp. v.W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., No. 90 C 7515, 1992 WL 13679, at *2-*3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 24, 1992) (citing Wang and Marvin Lumber); Stanford v.Kuwait Airways Corp., Nos.85
Civ. 0477 (SWK), 85 Civ. 2448 (SWK), 1989 WL 297860 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1989) (citing Paul
and Marvin Lumber).
115. See, e.g., City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 139 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(granting disqualification of structural engineering expert based on two-part test as articulated in
Wang).
116. See, e.g., A& AElec. Contractors, Inc. v. C.H. Nickerson& Co., No. CV89 0369686 S,
1993 WL 524996, at * 1-*3, *4(Conn.Super.Ct.Dec. 8,1993) (applying two-part test to disqualify
expert while rejecting disqualification of counsel).
117. See, e.g., Roundpoint v. V.N.A. Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (App. Div. 1995) (rejecting
disqualification of architectural expert since neither element of two-part analysis was satisfied).
118. 85 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. Id. at 1180.
120. Id. at 1182.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1183.
123. Id.
124. Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175-77 (Colo. 1999) (applying two-part analysis to
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Circuit, 2 indicates that it is safe to say that courts have adopted the Paul
test. 26 Thus, in UnitedStates v. Salamanca,'21 the prosecution attempted
to use the expert testimony of a translator who had previously provided
interpretation services for the defendant and defense counsel during the
course of twenty hours of attorney-client discussions.12 Applying the twopart confidentiality test of the disqualification doctrine, and further finding
no waiver of any privilege by the defendant, the court sustained the
objection to the expert and found "Salamanca has met the test necessary to
disqualify an expert: he objectively and reasonably believed that his
communications with his attorney through the interpreter were
confidential, these communications included privileged information, and
Salamanca did not waive the attorney-client privilege."' 129 Although not
expressly characterizing the interpreter as a side-switcher, the court's
discussion cited the underlying analysis concerning the risk of impropei
disclosure
and the potential harm to the public's trust of the judicial
30
system.
On the other hand, in Popular, Inc. v. Popular Staffing Services
Corp., the expert's initial interaction with the plaintiff with respect to the
confidentiality of the relationship and the information was not substantial
enough to create a cognizable conflict when that same expert was later
retained by the defendant. 3 2 Also applying the Paul methodology, in

disqualify car accident reconstruction expert); Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 903-04 (D.C.
1997) (applying two-part test to deny disqualification of medical expert who had been paid by both
sides, due to lack of confidential or privileged information). In Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 404 S.E.2d
607, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), the appellate court cited Paul and Marvin Lumber to affirm a trial
court's expert disqualification based on the consultant's previous communications with opposing
counsel in the formulation of expert opinions. In Donovan v. Bowling, 706 A.2d 937, 941 (R.I.
1998), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island cited Cordy and Wang, but distinguished them as being
inapplicable to the treating physician scenario.
125. See Hanlon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Sen's., 191 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (apparently approving expertdisqualification doctrine, but finding a different analysis to be applicable to the facts of that case).
126. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP),
2000 WL 42202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (granting disqualification of oncology expert by
applying two-part test plus balancing policy objectives); see also United States ex rel. Cherry Hill
Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997). In
finding the application of the attorney-conflict standard to be inappropriate because of different
roles in litigation, the court explained: "Experts act as sources of information and opinions in order
to assist parties and triers of fact to understand evidence." Id.
127. 244 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D.S.D. 2003).
128. Id. at 1025.
129. Id. at 1026.
130. Id.(citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C6157, 2002 WL 653893,
at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 19, 2002)).
131. 239 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.P.R. 2003).
132. Id. at 152.
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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc.,'33 the court rejected
disqualification, finding that any information conveyed by the defendant
in a previous case to its trial expert was not privileged because-as a
previous trial expert-his information "'would be an open book, available
for the opponent to review.""1 4 Significantly, the factual circumstances of
Popularand Chamberlainwere pointedly distinguished from the conflict
of interest implications that arise when an expert switches sides in the
same litigation-the scenario that caused disqualification in Salamanca.35
,
Thus, while an expert's prior affiliation with its current adversary will
not automatically warrant disqualification,'36 cases applying this analysis
have increasingly emphasized the distinction between side-switching' and
prior affiliation cases.' While the same legal standards apply to both

133. No. 01 C6157, 2002 WL 653893 (N.D. II. Apr. 19, 2002).
134. Id. at *4 (quoting Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container, 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 945
(N.D. I11.
2001)).
135. Popular,Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (commenting that side-switching would be a "'clear
case for disqualification"'); Chamberlain Group, Inc., 2002 WL 653893, at *5 ("Under those
circumstances, the risk of disclosure of confidential information is high and the public's trust in the
integrity of the judicial system is at stake.").
136. Viskase Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., No. 90 C7515, 1992 WL 136792, at *1-*2
(N.D.Ill. Jan. 24, 1992) (resin expert had been employed by Union Carbide six years earlier);
Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., Nos. 85 Civ. 0477, 85 Civ. 2448, 1989 WL 297860, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1989) (security expert had worked for International Air Transport Association
four years before events at issue).
137. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1995 WL
925673, at *2-*3, *4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1995) (denying disqualification); In re Ambassador Group,
Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 241, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying disqualification); Cordy v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 578-79, 582 (D.N.J. 1994) (granting disqualification);
Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying disqualification); Wang Labs., Inc. v.
Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1247, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1991) (granting disqualification); Turner
v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 766,769 (Va. 2001) (granting disqualification); Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981
P.2d 172, 174, 177 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (denying disqualification); Donovan v. Bowling, 706
A.2d 937, 939 (R.I. 1998) (denying disqualification); Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 902
(D.C. 1997) (denying disqualification); A & A Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. C.H. Nickerson & Co., No.
CV89 03696865, 1993 WL 524996, at *1, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1993) (granting
disqualification).
138. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75-76 (D. Mass.
2000); Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92 cv00592, 1996 WL 575946, at *5
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 6) (denying disqualification because "this is not a 'side-switching' case" but
"involves experts... who are affiliated (i.e., in partnership within Price Waterhouse)"), aft'd,951
F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Hansen v. Umtech Industrieservice Und Spedition, GMBH, Civ.
A. No. 95-516MMS, 1996 WL 622557, at *3, *4, *5, *8 (D. Del. July 3, 1996); see also, e.g.,
Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 426,431-32 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Space Sys./Loral v. Martin MariettaCorp., Civ. No. 95-20122 SW, 1995 WL 686369, at *3*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F.
Supp. 334, 338-39 (N.D. II. 1990); Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins, 744 A.2d 1209, 1224 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001).
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situations, one court described the judicial reaction to side-switching by
stating that it generally creates a conflict of interest and that "[iun such
circumstances, courts have unanimously held that such an expert would be
disqualified.' ' 39 While, depending upon the facts, the reality is that some
side-switching experts have not been disqualified,141 the act clearly triggers
exacting judicial scrutiny and frequent disqualifications. Conversely,
although disqualification has also been granted in several cases lodged in
the prior affiliation framework, 14 1 such outcomes are infrequent.
VII.

APPLYING DISQUALIFICATION CRITERIA: THE CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP FACTOR

While the outcomes and the analysis have varied at times, lower court
decisions addressing expert disqualification have almost invariably applied
concepts of inherent authority without any reference to the Supreme Court
decisions that have developed the doctrine. 42 Instead, the decisions follow
Paul to include the two-part analysis that examines first, whether a
confidential relationship was reasonably believed to have been formed and
second, whether the private information disclosed was sufficiently
important to warrant suppression of an expert's testimony. 143 In general,
decisions that look only to these two factors have held that experts should
be disqualified if both issues are answered affirmatively,
and that
44
disqualification is inappropriate if either part is not met. 1

139. United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1015 (W.D. Mo. 2001)
(citing Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1171, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996)).
140. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL 925673, at *2-*3
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (medical regulatory expert had several meetings with party and counsel and
received payment before switching sides); Nelson, 694 A.2d at 903 (denying disqualification even
though side-switching medical expert had received payment from both parties). But see Donovan,
706 A.2d at 937 (refusing to adopt defendant's assertion that defendant's paid consultation with
plaintiff's treating physician disqualifies physician from serving as witness for the plaintiff).
141. NHC Health Care Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16; United States v. Larkin, Hoffiman,
Daly & Lindgren, Civ. No. 3-92-789, 1994 WL 627569, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 1994); see also
Space Sys./Loral, 1995 WL 686369, at *2 (removing former Martin Marietta supervisor from
serving as adverse expert due to "substantial confidential information" he had received).
142. United Stated v. Salamanca, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1024 (D.S.D. 2003) (relying on Paul);
see also Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1171, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
various lower court decisions including English, Feedlot and Wang).
143. Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The burden
of proof is on the party seeking disqualification to establish that both elements of the
disqualification test have been established.").
144. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 244,249 (D.N.J. 1997). Cf In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 139 B.R. 869,872 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1992); Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991).
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With the test for confidential relationships, courts have delineated the
legal analysis with relative consistency. In accord with Paul,'45 courts have
generally rejected bright line standards that require a formal retention
agreement before a confidential relationship can be substantiated. 4 6 One
decision went as far as to find that "there is no 'right' way for an attorney
to retain an expert for purposes of litigation."'47 Even decisions that reject
disqualification based on the facts of the case have found that any actual
the expert would amount to a 'distinction
retention requirement 4of
8
without a difference."1
Thus, in Stencel v. FairchildCorp., the court found that so long as a
confidential relationship was relied upon reasonably, the relationship can
ripen prior to the delivery of a retainer agreement. 50 In that case, the
submission of a proposed retainer agreement, while not finalized, was
nonetheless a sufficient development to constitute "persuasive evidence"
that the litigant could reasonably rely on the confidentiality of its
communications with an expert.'' Also supportive of confidentiality in
Stencel was the litigant's agreement to pay the expert for any research or
conclusions. 5 2 Along the same line, an exchange of letters concerning an
expert's anticipated retention, even if somewhat ambiguous, can
corroborate the reasonableness of a litigant's reliance upon the
confidentiality of its expert discourse. 53
54
While formal agreements for retention are clearly not a prerequisite,
the absence of a specific agreement can be a factor in characterizing the
nature of a controverted relationship. For some courts, an omission is seen

145. Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 278 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
146. Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 768-69 (Va. 2001) (ruling that no formal retention is
required); Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 699 (Ct. App. 1994).
147. Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 581 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Paul, 123
F.R.D. at 279).
148. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citation
omitted); see also Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., Nos. C-95-03597 DLJ,
C-96-00942 DLJ, 1998 WL 230981, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1998) (denying disqualification

while noting that formal retention is not needed and that "although the existence of a confidentiality
agreement can be a relevant circumstance, the absence of such an agreement does not preclude a
finding that attorneys reasonably considered a pre-retention interview to be confidential").
149. 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

150. Id. at 1084. Thus, in a recent state supreme court decision, the court found that
disqualification was proper based upon a confidential review by an expert who was paid for his time
but ultimately never retained by the litigant or its counsel. Turner, 553 S.E.2d at 767.
151. Stencel, 174F. Supp. 2dat 1084.
152. Id.
153. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991).

154. Turner, 533 S.E.2d at 768; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., No. 95 CIV. 8833 (RPP), 2000 WL 42202, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (disqualifying
expert based on confidentiality agreement with Bristol).
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as evidence that the parties had not reached a point at which it would be
objectively reasonable for the litigant to believe it had entered into a
confidential relationship with a prospective expert. Thus, in Mayer v.
Dell,' the absence of a confidentiality agreement, or even a follow-up
letter, at the time of a consultation was found to be critical in reaching an
outcome that no disqualification should be ordered. 6 Along this line, in
Advanced CardiovascularSystems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,' the court
found that a confidential relationship had not been established by the
exchange of a draft agreement letter where the prospective expert had
cautioned counsel not to disclose privileged information.' 8
In determining the confidentiality of a relationship, courts may also
consider any relevant professional criteria that govern the challenged
expert. Thus, in UnitedStates ex rel.CherryHill ConvalescentCenter,Inc.
v. Healthcare Rehab Systems, Inc.,' 59 the court found that a party's
communications with an accounting expert were encircled by
confidentiality based on a state law that prevented the voluntary disclosure
of information gained through accounting services. 60 Further confirmation
of this professional standard was found in the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants Rule 30 which provided that a "member in
public practice shall not61disclose any confidential information without the
consent of the client."'

155. 139 F.R.D. I (D.D.C. 1991).
156. Id.at 3. As a result, the court concluded that the meeting between the plaintiff's counsel
and the challenged expert was "no more than a consultation to permit both plaintiff and Mr. Little
to determine whether Mr. Little might later be retained." Id; see also Commerce Indus. Ins. Co. v.
E. 1.duPont de Nemours & Co. (In re Maiden Mills Indus. Inc.), 275 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2002) ("There is no writing from the Plaintiffs, their lawyers or their consultant regarding
confidentiality."); Mayer, 139 F.R.D. at 3-4 ("[IThe meeting was a type of informal consultation
rather than the commencement of a longterm [sic] relationship.").
157. Nos. C-95-03577DLS, C-9C-00942DLJ, 1998 WL230981 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1998).
158. Id. at *5; see alsoIn re OrthopedicBone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1995
WL 925673, at *4-*5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1995). In Greene, Tweed of Delaware,Inc. v. DuPontDow
Elastomers,L.L. C., 202 F.R.D. 426 (E.D. Pa. 2001), the court found that even with a confidentiality
agreement signed by prior employees of DuPont, disqualification would be denied because of the
lack of a sufficient showing "that he was privy to confidential information relevant to the alleged
infringingproducts in this case." Id.at 430 (emphasis added). In Nikkal Industries,Ltd. v. Salton,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 188, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), a ninety minute consultation was characterized
by the U.S. magistrate as a "'comprehensive employment interview"' rather than "the
commencement of a long term [sic] relationship." Id at 190.
159. 994 F. Supp. 244 (D.N.J. 1997).
160. Id. at 249-50.
161. Id. at 250 (citing AM. INST. OFCERTIFIEDPUB. ACcOuNTANTS, CODEOFPROF'LCONDUCT
R. 30).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 3

FLORIDA LAW REI7EW

(Vol. 56

VIII. APPLYING DISQUALIFICATION CRITERIA: CONFIDENTIAL OR
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION FACTOR

In adjudicating the first element of the expert-disqualification
doctrine, 62 courts have largely concurred in a legal standard based on the
objectively reasonable belief in the prior existence of a confidential
relationship. 63 With the second element of analysis, legal tests have
diverged in qualitative and quantitative respects: first, in defining the
nature of confidential information that is critical; and second, in
determining how64 substantially tainted information must be to trigger
disqualification.1
A. The Nature of ProtectedInformation
Definitional issues begin with the original wording in Paul, which
addressed the disclosure to an expert of the first litigant's "confidential or
privileged information. ' 66 The use of disjunctive phrasing can bear
decisively upon outcomes, since information which some would consider
confidential may often include facts and opinions that may not be
privileged in a strict legal sense. For this reason, the district court in United
States v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren 66 emphasized that a bank
seeking disqualification of a former employee serving as an opposing
expert "need only prove that the information was either privileged or
confidential."'' 67 Finding that the former employee, during his employment
by the office of the Controller of the Currency, had gained access to the
bank's "sensitive and confidential information,"'' 68 the court refused to
allow him to testify as an expert against that bank. 169 Although not
characterized as privileged for evidentiary purposes, the court found that
the financial information gained by the bank examiner was nonetheless
confidential based on applicable federal regulations. 7 ° Along the same

162. Plainly, there can be overlap between the first and second components of the test. For
example, as observed in Wang: "But in more ambiguous circumstances, the disclosure of
confidential information may serve to support the-inference that the lawyer was objectively
reasonable in assuming the existence of a confidential relationship." Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1991).
163. See, e.g., id. at 1248.
164. Some courts have further articulated a duty of the moving party to demonstrate that
confidentiality, or if applicable, privilege, has not been waived. English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden
Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1503-04 (D. Colo. 1993).
165. Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
166. Civ. No. 3-92-789, 1994 WL 627569 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 1994).
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *1.
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line, a former government employee who had participated in discussions
within a state agency concerning the defendant's billing practices was
prohibited from serving as defendant's expert in later litigations against the
same state agency due to the "actual confidences"'' she obtained and the
"clear conflict of interest."'7
The premise that confidentialhas a broader meaning than privilegedfor
expert-disqualification purposes has been endorsed by the Fifth Circuit in
Koch Refining, and in most phrasings of the test among lower courts.' 73
Some decisions, though, still ask if in meeting the second prong for the
Paul test, the information must be "readily identified as either attorney
work product or within the scope of attorney-client privilege."' 74
Overwhelmingly, courts adhering to this narrower view of confidential
information for expert-disqualification purposes "make a distinction
between confidential business and financial records and confidential
communications related to a particular litigation." '75 In a state court
discussion underscoring the need to identify a "legally cognizable
confidence," it was noted that the expert was "not a lawyer, doctor or
priest," nor was he asked to "divulge classified military secrets. '"176
Similarly finding that prior access to a prior client's confidential
information, without more, does not prevent experts from testifying for an
adversary, a federal district court distinguished business confidences from
the nature of information that is protectable, explaining that
[c]onfidential information, in the context of expert
disqualification, includes: "discussion of the [retaining
party's] strategies in the litigation, the kinds of expert [the
party] expected to retain, [the party's] views of the strengths
and weaknesses of each side, the role of each of the
77 [party's]
witnesses to be hired, and anticipated defenses."'

171. United States v. NHC Health Care Corp. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 n.1 (W.D. Mo.
2001). The expert had "considerable involvement" in prior investigations and was likely to be a fact
witness. Id. at 1016.
172. Id.
173. Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996).
174. Commerce Indus. Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Malden Mills Indus.,
Inc.), 275 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
175. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 244, 251 (D.N.J. 1997).
176. Polensky v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1996), review
grantedandsupersededon othergrounds, 923 P.2d 88 (Cal. 1996). In Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins,
744 A.2d 1209, 1216 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), the challenged expert for the defendant had been
the treating physician for the plaintiff, but because Maryland did not recognize a physician-patient
privilege, the information gained by the expert was not privileged and disqualification was rejected.
177. HealthcareRehabSys., Inc, 994 F. Supp. at 250 (citing Koch Ref Co., 85 F.3d at 1182).
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For most courts, the mere expectation by a former client that information
shared with an expert would be confidential is insufficient to disqualify
that expert. For example, regardless of the client's sense of privacy about
his or her communications with an expert, the delivery to an expert of
matters of public record, including pleadings or other documents that are
broadly available, would not meet a standard for confidential information
that could support disqualification.'78 Along the same line, courts have said
that the delivery to an expert of purely technical information would not
support disqualification.' 79 Similarly, if a party could obtain the
information at issue through discovery, it is not "potentially prejudicial
confidential information,"'' 0 and therefore cannot lead to the
disqualification of an expert. Accordingly, "disclosure of independently
obtained, factual information which is subject to discovery anyway does
not raise the same level of concern."' '
As a result, to be considered confidential for expert-disqualification
purposes, the information must be of a character that is not ordinarily
discoverable. For that reason, courts have established that prior testifying
experts are rarely subject to disqualification if they later reappear on the
opposing side. 8 2 After all, an expert who actually testified previously was,
in effect, an "open book" who was subject to cross-examination and
required to disclose the information upon which he relied, 8 3 including

178. In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 139 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (rejecting
disqualification where only information given expert "was information available to everyone in the
case" and prior services to former client were no longer relevant).
179. Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996);
Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 176 (Colo. 1999); see also Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 4
(D.D.C. 1991) (finding "no more than 'a flow of information which was essentially technical'.)
(quoting Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
180. See Palmer v. Ozbek 144 F.R.D. 66, 68 (D. Md. 1992) (commenting that although
defendant's medical expert was exposed to information during an earlier two hour meeting with
plaintiff's experts, "this information was discoverable by defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1) and did not constitute potentially prejudicial confidential information") (footnotes
omitted).
181. Space Sys./Loral v. Martin Marietta Corp., Civ. No. 95-20122 SW, 1995 WL 686369,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995). The determinant is whether experts "had become privy to matters
protected by the attorney-client and possibly work-product privileges." Id. at *4.
182. See Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., City ofN.Y., 176 F.R.D. 445,449 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(implying that while discovery is restricted concerning consulting experts, both sides have access
to the reports and testimony of testifying experts); Chrisjulbrian Co. v. Upper St. Rose Fleeting Co.,
Civ. A No. 93-1879, 1994 WL 673440, at *2 (E.D. La 1994) (stating that as a testifying expert, the
factual basis for the expert's report was discoverable, and therefore reliance on confidentiality could
not be reasonable); see also English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs.,' Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1503
(D. Colo. 1993).
183. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C 6157, 2002 WL 653893, at *4
(N.D. I11.Apr. 19, 2002). Conversely, in Bristol-MyersSquibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc.,
No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2000 WL 42202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000), the court found that it
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discussions and materials provided by the client or counsel."8 4 Accordingly,
prior-testifying experts from an earlier case are ordinarily positioned to
switch in later litigation to an opposing side against a former client in a
fashion that might be considered reprehensible in the attorney-client
context.
B. Information and Imputation of Knowledge
Because the judicial positions on confidential or privileged information
have crystalized around an actual prejudice analysis,' 85 confidential
information that has not actually been communicated to an expert will not
be imputed simply by virtue of his or her employment.' 86 Thus, while
imputation principles among employees is a settled legal doctrine in the
world of corporate law, under an actual prejudice test, so long as there has
been no exchange of information between the employees at issue,
confidences known to one are not attributed to the challenged expert. 7
The reluctance to impute knowledge among co-workers in the expert
scenario also diverges sharply from attorney-client analysis that deems all
attorneys in a firm to be one lawyer for conflict of interest situations:
This distinction is inherent in the very nomenclature that
describes the parties. A witness is one who has engaged in the
activity of 'witnessing,' and is called to testify, truthfully and
under oath, as to what he observed or what he knows. An
expert witness is merely a witness with additional knowledge
beyond the ken of the layman, who helps the trier of fact

was objectively reasonable for the moving party to have concluded that a confidential relationship
existed with a non-testifying consultant.
184. As courts have repeatedly emphasized, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 makes it clear that "documents
and information disclosed to a testifying expert in connection with his testimony are discoverable"
irrespective ofwhether the expert relies on those documents and information. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
185. Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 450; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734
F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. III. 1990) (implying that unless truly confidential information is exposed,
no prejudice occurs).
186. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
944 F. Supp. 244, 250 (D.N.J. 1997) (accounting firm); see also City of Springfield v. Rexnord
Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D. Mass. 2000). But see City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867
P.2d 137, 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) ("Even if no disclosures occur, the court and the public are
faced with the reality that a single firm has acted as a consultant for both sides in an adversarial
situation.") (disqualifying structural engineering expert).
187. Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Healthcare
Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 249; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 734 F. Supp. at 339; see
also Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 949 (N.D. III. 2001);
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:42cv00592, 1996 WL 575946, at *5 (M.D.N.C.
Sept. 6), aftid, 951 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1996). But see-City of Westminster, 867 P.2d at 140.
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understand scientific, technical or other specialized topics....
In contrast, an advocate is one who engages in the activity of
advocating. To advocate does not mean to offer facts; it
means to characterize and sculpt the facts ....Thus, the
advocate
is beholden to her client as much as she is to the
88
truth.

In a recent confirmation of this distinction,'89 the Central District of
California in Stencel squarely rejected the adoption of an imputeddisqualification doctrine for experts, finding that "they perform a very
different function in litigation than do lawyers."' 9 °
Rather than apply imputation principles to disqualify experts,' 9' courts
have embraced remedial measures,'92 including the imposition of screens

188. Stencel, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also In re
Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that attorneys
occupy positions of higher trust than other professionals, including accountants); Chrisjulbrian Co.
v. Upper St. Rose Fleeting Co., Inc., Civ. A No. 93-1879, 1994 WL 673440, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec.
2, 1994) (noting that there is a "less stigma attached to an expert 'changing sides' in the midst of
litigation than an attorney who occupies a position ofhighertrust"); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden
Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (D. Colo. 1993) ("Experts are not advocates in the litigation
but sources of information and opinions.").
189. FoodLion, Inc., 1996 WL 575946, at *5 (noting that there was "absolutely no showing
of the exchange of substantive information between ABC's experts and affiliated persons in Price
Waterhouse"); see also City of Springfield, I ll F. Supp. 2d at 75 (noting that there was "no
evidence of any substantive communication between Haley & Aldrich employees working for
Defendants and those working for... the landfill project"); see generallyCommerce Indus. Ins.
Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (In re Maiden Mills Indus., Inc.), 275 B.R. 670 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2002) (same firm employs consulting expert for one side and testifying expert for other;
routine tests by consulting expert were "'blind' and standardized" and did not constitute
confidential information and were not imputed).
190. 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; see also Hansen v. Umtech Industrieservice Und Spedition,
GMBH, Civ. A No. 95-516MMS, 1996 WL 622557 (D. Del. July 3, 1996). In Hansen,
disqualification was denied where the same medical consulting firm, through different members
unaware of the others' involvement, had been retained at different times on opposing sides in the
same case. Id. at *2-*3.
191. Food Lion, Inc., 1996 WL 575946, at *4.But see City of Westminster, 867 P.2d at 140.
In affirming disqualification in light of the need "to protect the integrity of the advisory process"
the court reasoned: "Thus, two members of the same firm were involved in a complex and important
subject.... Even if no disclosures occur, the court and the public are faced with the reality that a
single firm has acted as a consultant for both sides in an adversarial situation." Id.
192. Food Lion, Inc., 1996 WL 575946, at *5 (noting no "significant likelihood of future
inadvertent disclosures"); see also Viskase Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., No. 90 C 7515, 1992
WL 13679, at *2 (N.D. Il1.Jan. 24, 1992) (noting that operating procedures of Union Carbide
restricted information to only those working within the subject division). When a consulting
company's employees are situated in different offices, even in different states, any argument for
imputation is weakened further. Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp.
2d 938, 949 (M.D. Il1.2001).
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between different experts whenever members of the same firm have had
contact with opposing litigants.193
While reluctant to attribute information between individuals who have
had no actual exchanges, courts will likely not countenance prospective
courtroom dueling between experts employed by the same company on
opposite sides of a case. Should different experts from the same consulting
firm remain active on opposite sides of the same case at the same time,
disqualification may be required simply to avoid the unseemliness of
having the one firm testify against itself in the same trial.'9 4
C. SubstantialityofKnowledge
Even when information has been shared which meets the standards for
confidentiality or privilege, courts do not automatically disqualify. There
is no presumption concerning a disqualifying taint'95 and, to the contrary,
the burden of demonstrating an infectious exposure to non-discoverable,
confidential information falls upon the party seeking disqualification.' 96
While a few courts have indicated that merely the potential for infection
from confidential information will suffice, 197 more frequently courts
193. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. at 245 (explaining that measures to
wall off information to prevent any inappropriate exchanges and "have been held sufficient to dispel
fears of possible future disclosures of confidential information"). Another court summarized
screening procedures, including:
"(1) instructions given to all members of the new firm, of the attorney's recusal
and of the ban on exchange of information; (2) prohibited access to the files and
other information on the case; (3) locked case files with keys distributed to a select
few; (4) secret codes necessary to access pertinent information on electronic
hardware; and (5) prohibited sharing in the fees derived from such" representation.
Stencel, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (quoting Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir.
1994)). The location of experts, employed by the same firm, but who were in different offices over
500 miles apart was also seen as a factor militating against disqualification. Id. at 1087; see also
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. -2d at 948; B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship,
Nos. A096780, A096583, 2002 WL 31628763, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002).
194. Sells v. Wamser, 158 F.R.D. 390, 391-92 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Confronting this dilemma,
the court in Sells found that "[iut would be unseemly, at best, to permit representatives of the same
engineering firm to testify on opposite sides of the case, and to expect those persons to be
objectively critical of each other's testimony." Id. at 393-94. Rather than remove both experts, the
court opted to restore the statusquo before the conflict occurred, thereby allowing the first retained
expert to continue while disqualifying the second. Id. at 395.
195. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997).
196. Courts have articulated a further need to show that confidentiality has not been waived.
See id.; see also Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 426,
430 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
197. See Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 8898, 1989 WL
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require at least a reasonable probability that an expert98received information
deemed confidential for disqualification purposes.
Assuming at least some protectable confidences have been overtly
exposed, several courts have imposed disqualification even though the
value of confidential information was "debatable"' 99 due to the difficulty
in qualifying the impact of the exposure. 20 0 As a result, so long as
confidential or privileged information was clearly conveyed at an earlier
time, the challenged expert's assertion that he has no recollection of any
specifics will generally not eliminate the taint. In one reaction to the
expert's alleged lack of recollection, the court reasoned, "However, the
prejudice (of disqualification) is not such that it overcomes the risk that
[the expert] will minimally be subconsciously affected by the information
he received from defense counsel. '20 ' Thus, the court in Theriot v. Parish
of Jefferson21 2 did not dissect the ingredients of specific, demonstrable

31514, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2000 WL 42202, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (stating that
oncology expert's prior discussions with objecting litigant "raise the potential for breach of
Bristol's confidences in those discussions"); United States v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren,
Civ. No. 3-92-789, 1994 WL 627569, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 1994); Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d
765,768-69 (Va. 2001); Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo. 1999); City ofWestminster
v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
198. This standard is usually rejected because courts underscore the clear distinction between
attorney-disqualification standards and the disqualification doctrine for experts. HealthcareRehab
Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 244; Wyatt v. Hanan, 871 F. Supp. 415, 420 (M.D. Ala. 1994); W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 64 (D. Md. 1993).
199. Turner, 553 S.E.2d at 768 ("While we recognize that the value of the information that
plaintiff's counsel disclosed to Sanders may be debatable, that fact does not negate our [c]onclusion
that the letter contains the work product of plaintiff's counsel.").
200. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1991). In
Mitchell, 981 P.2d at 177, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that:
The discussions that took place during the July 15, 1998 phone conference could

very well have impacted Brault's subsequent participation on behalf of Mitchell,
and it is difficult to say with confidence that Brault would have produced the same
report and drawn the same conclusions if he had never spoken to counsel for
Wilmore.... Once a court concludes that confidential information has been
disclosed, it is this difficulty in determining conclusively what impact such
information might have on the expert's analysis or subsequent testimony that
justifies the invocation of the rule.
Id.
201. Michelson, 1989 WL 31514, at *5. But see Hansen v. Amdec Industrieservice Und
Spedition, GMBH, Civ. A. No. 95-516, 1996 WL 622557, at *7-*8 (D. Del. July 3, 1996) (denying
motion to disqualify expert who forgot about earlier discussions with counsel because there was "so
little of substance" in jeopardy).
202. Civ. A. No. 95-2453, 1996 WL 392149 (E.D. La. July 8, 1996).
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prejudice in disqualifying a political expert in a reapportionment case.20 3
Finding that during the liability phase, his services for the defendant
exposed him to strategy sessions that included confidential information, the
court ruled that he was "simply too close and too intimately involved...
in the very process" for side-switching to be countenanced.0 4
In close calls, disqualifications based on a lesser showing0 ' usually
entail prior discussions of: a party's strategies in litigation; the kinds of
experts that the retaining party expected to employ; a party's views of the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case; the role of each of the
litigant's expert witnesses to be hired; and anticipated defenses. 2 6 Thus,
emphasizing the need to protect disclosures of "counsel's theory of the
case, and counsel's mental impressions, 20 7 courts more readily impose
disqualification when needed to protect against the disclosure of attorneyclient communications. °8
The court addressed closely related considerations in WR. Grace Co.
v. Gracecare,Inc.,2 °9 when the court considered whether to disqualify an
attorney-expert in a trademark dispute.210 Finding that "the duties of an
attorney-expert are greater than the ordinary expert[,J ' 2" the court did not
require proof of actual prejudice, but instead found "a reasonable
probability" that confidences were exchanged,21 2 even if the direction of
the relationship was "minimal" and amounted to "nothing more than ajob
interview., 21 3 In Commonwealth Insurance Co. v. Stone Container
203. See generally id.
204. Id. at *2.
205. Mitchell, 981 P.2d at 175 ("A particularly clear case for disqualification can be made
when an expert is privy to explicit discussions of strategy related to the pending litigation."). See
also Commerce Indus. Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Malden Mills Indus. Inc.),
275 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (nature of communications between an attorney and an
expert is key) (citing Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279-80 (S.D. Ohio
1988)); B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P., v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780, A096583, 2002 WL
31628763 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002) (granting disqualification).
206. Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Va. 2001).
207. Id.; see also Theriot, 1996 WL 392149, at *2. Compare Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410,414 (D. Utah 1999) (rejecting disqualification where mental impressions
of counsel were only incidentally involved), with Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 67 (D. Md.
1992) (rejecting disqualification when expert was never contacted by attorneys).
208. See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assoc., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 712, 724
(D. Conn. 1991). Consistent with the prevailing authority, the court in MMR/Wallace disqualified
counsel, which had contacted its adversary's former employee to obtain "confidentialor privileged
information... pertaining to MMR's trial strategy and tactics in this case, thereby tainting the
integrity of the trial process." Id.
209. 152 F.R.D. 61 (D. Md. 1993).
210. Id. at 63.
211. Id.at65.
212. Id. at 66.
213. Id. at 65-66 ("all doubts in favor of disqualification to avoid the appearance of
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Corp.,214 on the other hand, the court found that engagement of an attorney
as an expert did not create an attorney-client relationship."' Because the
expert retention was unrelated to the
1 6 attorney-client services for the client,
the court denied disqualification.
While provable disclosures of legal strategies and lawyer analysis have
been the leading sources of disqualification, when controversies lie beyond
the realm of attorney confidences, courts usually require proof that a
substantial quantum of confidential information was actually received by
the challenged expert.217 These decisions accentuate the practical need to
demonstrate an actual, tangible prejudice before the "drastic" remedy of
disqualification can be granted. Underscoring this philosophy of
reluctance, 218 one decision found that despite a relationship conducive to
confidential disclosures, the objecting party had not imparted significant,
confidential communications. 2 9 Accordingly, even if an expert's previous
experience with a litigant results in general knowledge about its operations,
absent knowledge of confidential products or procedures specific to the
subject litigation, the expert ordinarily will not need to vacate the current
assignment.220 Just as clearly, the fact that the objecting party formerly
employed an expert,221 or that he worked for a litigant's counsel
in
222
previous litigation does not, by itself, warrant disqualification.

impropriety and to preserve the integrity of this proceeding" in the attomey-expert context).
214. 178 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. I11.
2001).
215. Id. at 944.
216. Id.
217. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
218. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999) ("Where the
federal discovery rules have no application, and there is no retained consultant relationship, the
court should be very reluctant to impose disqualification.").
219. Hanlon v. Sec'y ofHealth &Human Servs., 191 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("This
does not mandate disqualification unless it is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Gomez possessed
confidential information that would prejudice the Hanlons."); see also Stencel v. Fairchild Corp.,
174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Plaintiff has not clearly asserted any prejudice it
might suffer from Smegal's retention as expert.").
220. Viskase Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 90 C 7515, 1992 WL 13679, at *2 (N.D. III. Jan.
24, 1992) ("He has general experience, but no experience specific to the products or patents in
suit.").
221. Id.at *2 (noting that the expert "had no involvement with the resins or patents directly
at issue in this case"); see also Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., Nos. 85 Civ. 0477(SWK), 85
Civ. 2448 (SWK), 1898 WL 297860, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1989). But see B-C Hous. P'ship,
L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780, A096583, 2002 WL 31628763 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2002) (expressing serious reservations about the practice of retaining an adversary's former
employee who has relevant inside knowledge as an expert).
222. Hanlon, 191 F.3d at 1349 (stating that expert testimony for plaintiff's counsel in prior
case does not disqualify expert); Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C.
202 F.R.D. 426 (E.D. Pa. 2001); City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., Ill F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.
Mass. 2000) (the fact that an engineering firm worked on different projects at two different
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Thus, one party's prior use of a consultant on issues pertaining to an
earlier litigation will not necessarily lead to disqualification when that
expert later joins an opposing camp.223 Even prior engagements that are
24
related to the challenged subject matter often fail to trigger intervention.
Thus, in a patent dispute, the court rejected disqualification even though
the expert currently engaged by the plaintiff had previously worked in the
defendant's development of an operationally similar technology. 225 To
sufficiently demonstrate the requisite "substantial relationship," the party
seeking disqualification must show that the expert was privy to
'confidential information concerning.., the specific technology at issue
in this lawsuit. "226
IX. APPLYING DISQUALIFICATION CRITERIA: BALANCING PUBLIC
INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS

Overwhelmingly, recent decisions have applied the expertdisqualification doctrine through a two-part test that, as discussed earlier,
requires a confidential relationship and a prior disclosure of confidential
or privileged information.227 In most cases, the inquiry is resolved if a party

locations does not support disqualification); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., No.
Civ. A. 94-CV-0752, 1995 WL 376471 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995); Roundpoint v. V.N.A. Inc., 621
N.Y.S.2d 161,163 (App. Div. 1995).
223. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc., 1995 WL 376471, at *1 (stating that engagement in other
litigation "does not relate to this action"); see also Hanlon, 191 F.3d at 1350 (ruling that prior
testimony for opposing counsel in a different case years earlier did not justify removal of expert).
In Space Systems/Loral v. Martin Marietta Corp., a manufacturer of spinal-fixation devices
confronting a series of product liability cases twice met with a consultant and the manufacturer's
litigation counsel to discuss medical-regulatory issues. Civ. No. 95-20122, 1995 WL 686369 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 1995). Nonetheless, because the information conveyed earlier to the expert was not
immune to civil discovery, disqualification was denied. Id. at *5.
224. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92cv00592, 1996 WL 575946
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 6,), affd, 951 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
225. See Green, Tweed ofDel., Inc, 202 F.R.D. at 430.
226. Id. (quoting Space Sys./Loral, 1995 WL 686369); see also Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co.
v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ.8833(PPP), 2000 WL 42202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2000) ("Confidential information [was]... so intertwined with that case as to make the confidential
information relevant to his proposed testimony."); In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F.
Supp. 237,244-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the objecting party had "not convincingly detailed
... a substantial relationship"); Viskase Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., No. 90-C7515, 1992
WL 13679, at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1992) (resin expert had held authoritative positions at Union
Carbide but had left seven years earlier and had "general experience but no experience specific to
the products or patents in suit").
227. Greene, Tweed ofDel., Inc., 202 F.R.D. at 428. Many cases only rely on the two-part test.
See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 95-03577, 1998 WL 230981, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1998); see also United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v.
Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997); Hansen v. Amdec
Industrieservice Und Spedition, GMBH, Civ. A. No. 95-516MMS, 1996 WL 622557 (D. Del. July
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seeking disqualification fails sufficiently to establish either of those
elements. 228 A minority view holds that even without the requisite invasion
of confidentiality, disqualification might be required "to protect the
integrity of the adversary process. 229 The trend of recent decisions,
however, speaks to a third tier of analysis that balances the competing
policy considerations in determining whether an expert should be
disqualified.230
Because the expert-disqualification doctrine is based upon the inherent
authority to protect the integrity of the judicial process and promote public
confidence in the legal system, the balancing analysis ordinarily defines
these ethically-based considerations as important factors in any
disqualification controversy.23' Although some courts have referred to
concerns about the "appearance of impropriety, ' 23 2 no court has

3, 1996); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc., 1995 WL 376471, at *1; Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1
(D.D.C. 1991); Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 903-04 (D.C. 1997).
228. See, e.g., Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc., 202 F.R.D. at 429.
229. City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); see also
City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., I l l F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D. Mass. 2000).
230. See, e.g., Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 251. This analysis corresponds conceptually to the
traditional duty found in FED. R. EVID. 403 to weigh the probative value of evidence against the
prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangerofunfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
231. See Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, No. 95-2453, 1996 WL 392149, at *2 (E.D. La. July
8, 1996) (disqualifying political expert who had been "too intimately involved" on behalf of his
current opposition to prevent conflicts of interest and maintain the integrity of the judicial process);
see also Sells v. Wamser, 158 F.R.D. 390, 393 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("Paulestablishes that the overall
guiding principle is to preserve the integrity of court proceedings and that any remedy imposed in
a case where an expert witness has a conflict of interest should promote fundamental fairness in the
litigation process."); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 65-66 (D. Md. 1993)
(granting disqualification of attorney-expert to avoid appearances of impropriety and protect the
integrity of the proceeding); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1504
(D. Colo. 1993) (stating that the main concerns favoring disqualification are avoiding conflicts of
interest and the integrity of the system); Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, No.
83 CIV. 8898, 1989 WL 31514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989) ("Permitting him to testify would
at best create an appearance of impropriety."). Several decisions have found that the exposure of
confidential information known to a tainted expert so infected counsel that disqualification of both
was required. B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780, A096780, 2002 WL
31628763, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 1013, 1016-17 (W.D. Mo. 2001) ("clear conflict of interest" required disqualification of
former government employee even though decision did not specify the substantiality of actual
prejudice); City of Westminster, 867 P.2d at 140.
232. Topps Co., Inc. v. Productos Stani Sociedad Anomina Industrial y Commercial, No. 99
Civ. 9437, 2001 WL 406193, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001); see In re Commerce Indus. Ins. Co.
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Malden Mills Indus., Inc.), 275 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. D.
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disqualified an expert merely upon the unseemliness of an engagement,
even in blatant side-switching cases. 233 Nonetheless, side-switching experts
are especially troubling to courts because of obvious concerns about
conflicts of interest and the resulting improper appearance. In cases in
which experts actually have billed two different sides for their services in
the same litigation, the integrity and public confidence concerns become
all the more compelling.234 Indeed, an expert's attempt to return a payment
received from his former client after he had switched sides in the litigation
engendered more admonishment than appreciation. 2"
Related to this integrity concern is a recurring aversion to any attempts
by litigants to manipulate the process in order to preempt an opponent from
using a particular expert. As one court acknowledged, "Indeed, sometimes
disqualification motions are brought for purely strategic purposes. '236 The
prospect that a litigant will consult with an expert merely to disqualify him
has been described as "abhorrent"
by one court,237 condemned as
"unscrupulous" by another, 238 and roundly condemned throughout the
history of the expert-disqualification doctrine.239 In fact, in validating the
prerequisite of confidential information, Wang explained: 240 "Were this not
so, lawyers could then disable potentially troublesome experts merely by
retaining them, without intending to use them as consultants. Lawyers

Mass. 2002) (concluding that guarding the integrity ofthe system, absent impermissible disclosures,
was "so nebulous" a basis for disqualification that a moving party might exploit the loose standard
to secure tactical advantages).
233. But see City of Westminister, 867 P.2d at 140. In that case, two different experts
employed by the same consulting firm, had worked "for both sides in an adversarial situation." Id.
at 140. Even though no disclosures were exchanged, the appellate court affirmed disqualification.
Id. at 140, 143. Taking into account its duty to protect the integrity of the judicial process, the trial
court could reasonably have concluded that a conflict of interest had arisen that was sufficient to
justify disqualification. Id. at 140.
234. See, e.g., Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 767-68 (Va. 2001).
235. But see Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999) ("The
mere payment for consulting time does not make an expert per se a retained expert.").
236. WP Grace & Co., 152 F.R.D. at 64.
237. Id. at 64 n.4.
238. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also
Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 67 n.4 (D. Md. 1992).
239. As the California court reasoned in Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, while
such may be "legitimate concems]," they should not define the outcome if nothing in the record
suggests a like intention. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 699 n.9 (Ct. App. 1994). "If such a case were to
develop, we believe a trial court will be able to resolve such a claim." Id.
240. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991); see
also Haugen, 184 F.R.D. at 413 (commenting that this manipulation could "defeat the quest for
truth" and be "susceptible to corrupt use"); Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271,
281-82 (S.D. Ohio 1998); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1505 (D.
Colo. 1993).
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using this ploy are not seeking expert help with their case; instead, they are
attempting only to prevent opposing lawyers from obtaining an expert. 24'
Indeed, in several cases in which an otherwise strong presumption for
disqualification was present, courts rejected disqualification when it
appeared that the movant had initially consulted with an expert who
seemed manifestly better suited for the opponent's cause. Without making
findings or proving bad faith, the courts in several cases pointedly
observed that the experts had already taken public positions on issues that
should have alerted the first litigant to the likelihood that the expert would
not be of any positive value to that party's position in the litigation.242
In addition to integrity-based concerns, courts also focus on practical
considerations in the third-tier balancing test. Courts consistently respect
the expert's entitlement to pursue his or her own profession.243
Correspondingly, courts recognize the validity of a party's right to select
its own experts,244 a prerogative which is obviously undermined by
disqualification. 245 These factors become especially important in scenarios
of highly specialized knowledge where relatively few experts are available
to a litigant.246 Just as courts have granted disqualification upon a finding
that a number of other experts are available,247 they have recognized,

241. Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1248.
242. Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 281-82. In In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability
Litigation, an apparent case of side-switching, the court rejected disqualification sought by a litigant
against an expert whose negative view concerning its spinal fixation system was widely publicized
well before the litigant sought out that expert for consulting purposes. No. MDL 1014, 1995 WL
925673, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1995); see also English Feedlot, Inc., 883 F. Supp. at 1498.
243. English Feedlot, Inc., 833 F. Supp. at 1505; see also Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C 6157, 2002 WL 653893, at *4 (N.D. II!. Apr. 19, 2002); Stencel v.
Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
244. See Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 67-68 (D. Md. 1992) (denying disqualification of
nationally recognized expert on hearing-impaired children because courts are especially reluctant
to disqualify experts who "possess useful specialized knowledge"); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.,
139 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (rejecting disqualification of an economist valuing
personal injury claims). In granting the motion to employ an expert, the court analogized t? the
right to choose counsel and said, "[tihe starting point in a proper analysis ought to be that generally
a party should have the right to employ a professional of its choice, and with whom it has
confidence, one in which it is comfortable." Id. at 871.
245. See Roundpoint v. V.N.A. Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App. Div. 1995) ("As a general
proposition, a party has the right to present the testimony that best supports its position.").
246. Topps Co. v. Productos Stani Sociedad Anomina Industrial y Commercial, No. 93 Civ.
9-137, 2001 WL 406193, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001); see also Campbell Indus. v. MN
Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that disqualification of an expert tainted by ex
parte contact not to be prejudicial since party had other experts who had examined the same boat);
English Feedlot,Inc., 833 F. Supp. at 1505; Palmer, 144 F.R.D. at 66.
247. B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780, A096583, 2002 WL
31628763, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002) ("His expertise is not irreplaceable."); see also
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 8833 (RPP), 2000 WL
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conversely, that a scarcity of experts in a particular field militates against
disqualification.2 48 As a result, courts are less likely to disqualify experts
with highly specialized knowledge or a long-standing relationship with the
client presently using his or her services.249 In all events, courts are
properly adverse to the erasure of relevant expert testimony if a practicable
substitute is unavailable. 2 0 Because a transcendent concern is the "desire
for probative information," courts approach disqualification with
understandable caution since "such a truth-finding mission favors the
25
admission of testimony by an expert who could assist the trier of fact." '
In several decisions, the courts have also examined the professional
criteria governing the expert at issue. While, in general, courts have not
relied upon professional rules to establish a basis for disqualification, they
have examined professional criteria to confirm that the expert will act
responsibly to refrain from improper disclosures and to avoid conflicts of
interest. Thus, in City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp.,252 the court, in
rejecting disqualification of an engineering expert, quoted from the code
of ethics for engineers in concluding that the engineering expert would be
required to avoid any misuse of confidential information.2 3

42202, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (stating that it was "not shown that there are not other experts
in the treatment of ovarian cancer available to testify").
248. Thus, inAgron v. Trustees ofColumbia University,City ofNew York, the court contrasted
the circumstances of an expert possessing "unique evidence," with testimony that is overlapping
and cumulative. 176 F.R.D. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Topps Co., 2001 WL 406193, at
*2 (commenting that there are "very few people in the world who are knowledgeable in the area of
chewing gum... [and] even fewer.., in the area of gum base").
249. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 244, 252 (D.N.J. 1997).
250. As one court reasoned, "it should be underscored that to recognize such protection and
allow disqualification frustrates the truth and deprives the litigation of relevant evidence." Proctor
& Gamble v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410,413 (D. Utah 1999) (rejecting disqualification ofexpert who
had consulted several years earlier with objecting party).
251. Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 450. In Agron, this concern was intensified by the passage of time
that made psychiatric evaluation of the plaintiff's current condition less meaningful than during the
alleged discrimination. "In that respect, Deutsch possesses knowledge that cannot be replicated by
the new expert." Id. at 453; see also Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 L 6157,
2002 WL 653893, at *4 (N.D. I11.Apr. 19, 2002) (ruling that selection was not in bad faith since
party had used patent expert in six other proceedings).
252. 111 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D. Mass. 2000).
253. Id.at 76 n.3. The court discussed Society ofProfessional Engineers canons and observed:
Among other obligations, engineers are prohibited from disclosing "confidential
information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present
or former client or employer without his consent. In particular, engineers are
forbidden 'without the consent of all interested parties' from participating in or
representing 'an advisory interest in connection with a specific project or
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254 the court
Correspondingly, in In reAmbassador Group,Inc., Litigation,
examined professional criteria to conclude that because different
accounting engagements were involved, Coopers & Lybrand could work
against an insurance receivership even though the firm had earlier
represented the same receiver concerning a different insolvent insurer."'
As with other issues of potential prejudice to litigants, courts typically
examine the timing of disqualification motions. Certainly, attempts to seek
disqualification, as with other motions, are usually more convincing when
56
brought promptly after a party learns of grounds for that application.
Correspondingly, because prejudice is a cornerstone of disqualification
analysis,25 7 disqualification motions brought shortly before trial, creating
a risk that a party may not be readily positioned to obtain a new expert, are
less likely to be granted. 5 8
Timing also bears upon a litigant's investment in an expert.259 In
respecting a party's right to select its own expert, courts recognize that the
longer an expert has been employed, the greater the hardship of replicating
the investment of time and money required to bring another expert up to
speed in the litigation.260

proceeding in which the engineer has gained particular specialized knowledge on
behalf of a former client or employer."
Id.

254. 879 F. Supp. 237 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
255. Id. at 245-46 (citing conflict of interest rules published by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants). Based on accounting criteria and expert testimony, the court found
that the two different insurance receiverships constituted different engagements with different
clients for conflict purposes.
256. English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (D. Colo. 1993)
(denying disqualification where party waited eight months after expert's deposition before filing
motion); see also Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 861 n.16 (11 th Cir.
1983) (in a decision prior to Paul,the circuit court affirmed a denial of disqualification requested
by a party one month before trial and eight months after learning of the alleged conflict).
257. United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 244, 251 (D.N.J. 1997); see also Fitz, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 184 F.R.D.
532, 539 (D.N.J. 1999) ("[P]laintiff would be severally prejudiced if Mr. Fernandez was
disqualified.").
258. See, e.g., Commerce Indus. Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Malden
Mills Indus., Inc.), 275 B.R. 670 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); see also City of Westminster v. MOA,
Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming disqualification but reversing order
denying litigant opportunity to secure a replacement expert).
259. See Malden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. at 675 ("Allowing the disqualification of Dr.
Ebadat this close to the end of discovery without the Plaintiffs making the required showing for
disqualification harms the Defendants' preparation of this case.").
260. See generally Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., Nos. C-95-03577
DLJ, C-96-00942 DLJ, 1998 WL 230981 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1998) (disqualification denied
concerning accounting firm that had performed over 700 hours of analysis); HealthcareRehab Sys.,
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Courts also examine the measures being implemented to minimize any
risk that confidences would be violated.26' Moreover, litigants improve
their position when, upon learning of the potential problem, they manifest
sensitivity to the issue and inform the opponent of the concern.262
X. DISQUALIFICATION PROCEDURES AND PRESUMPTIONS
There is no presumption favoring expert disqualification and, to the
contrary, courts uniformly state that the burden is imposed on the party
seeking disqualification, irrespective of which side is the party moving
for judicial determination of the issue.2 4 Several litigants whose experts
face challenges have moved proactively for judicial guidance, structuring
the motion as a motion to overrule plaintiffs objections, 26 a motion to
prevent an improper attempt to disqualify an expert,266 a motion to resolve
objections, 26176or a motion to use and interview a challenged expert.268 In
general, courts have reacted positively to a litigant's initiative in taking
affirmative steps to resolve the potential disqualification issue. 269 As one
court observed, "if indeed there is a conflict mandating disqualification, it
is best that be known sooner rather than later., 270 In all events, courts have
made it clear that by affirmatively filing a motion, the movant does not
assume the responsibility for carrying a burden to show that
disqualification is inappropriate. 27 ' To the contrary, even when the party
advocating disqualification is not the moving party, that party will,

Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 251 (disqualification denied with respect to accounting expert).
261. See, e.g., Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92cv00592, 1996 WL 575946 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 6), affd, 951
F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1996); B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos. A096780,
A096583, 2002 WL 31628763 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002).
262. City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., I 11 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D. Mass. 2000).
263. Advanced CardiovascularSys., Inc., 1998 WL 230981; HealthcareRehab Sys., Inc., 994
F. Supp. at 249; Nikkal Indus. Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
264. Malden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. at 673 (placing burden on party advocating
disqualification even if other litigant is the movant); see also Topps Co. v. Productos Stani
Sociedad Anomina Industrial y Commercial, No. 99 Civ. 9437(CSH)(GWG), 2001 WL 406193
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001).
265. City of Springfield, III F. Supp. 2d at 71.
266. Malden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. at 670.
267. Topps Co., 2001 WL 406193 (granting motion and allowing expert in gum-based
technology to testify).
268. Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 119 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
269. Malden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. at 670; City of Springield, I I F. Supp. 2d at 72
("[Tihe court agrees that, given the complex nature of this case, they did not have the luxury of
waiting for plaintiff to file a motion to disqualify."); Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 118 (granting motion
for use of challenged expert).
270. City of Springfield, III F. Supp. 2d at 74.
271. Topps Co., 2001 WL 406193, at *l;Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 118.
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nonetheless, retain the burden of demonstrating grounds for
disqualification. 2
In determining whether they should grant disqualification, courts
require sworn evidence and have not granted this remedy upon unverified
papers.2 73 Because information that allegedly infected an expert may be
confidential, courts have the option to review materials in camera at the
trial court level 274 or on appeal. 271 Moreover, courts ordinarily do not grant
disqualification based upon statements that are considered vague,276
general, or conclusory. Indeed, the greatest degree of specificity is
needed to substantiate a request that an otherwise qualified expert, able to
provide competent testimony on the merits, be jettisoned from a case. 278 As
described earlier, some decisions, like Greene, Tweed ofDelaware,Inc. v.
DuPontDow Elastomers,L.L. C., 279 insist on a specific showing that workproduct or attorney-client materials are implicated by the consultation with
the first litigant:
Nor can DuPont satisfy its burden by making conclusory
assertions that the proposed experts were "privy to substantial
confidential information related and unrelated to this
litigation."... For example, DuPont's conclusory assertions
that certain information is "not publicly available," without
supporting evidence, is not enough to satisfy the burden of
showing confidentiality and its non-waiver.
272. City ofSpringfield, II1 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
273. Maiden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. at 674 (stating that party seeking disqualification was
"unsupported by affidavits" and "full of conclusory remarks").
274. Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 426, 431
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
275. Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Va. 2001) (overruling objection to engineering
expert).
276. In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Statements were vague and ambiguous and fail to support an argument that the Receiver would
thereby be prejudiced.").
277. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C6157,2002 WL 653893, at *3 (N.D.
II1. Apr. 19, 2002) ("offers nothing more than conclusory affidavits that state Dr. Rhyne was
exposed to confidential business strategy"); Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc., 202 F.R.D. at 429
("Furthermore, the party requesting disqualification may not meet its burden with 'mere conclusory
or ipse dixit assertions."'); Topps Co. v. Productos Stan: Sociedad Anomina Industrial y
Commercial, No. 99 Civ. 9437(CSH)(GWG), 2001 WL 406193 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001); In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1995 WL 925673 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
1995).
278. See United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (W.D. Mo. 2001)
(detailed affidavit established basis for disqualification of health care billing expert); see also
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 8833(RPP), 2000 WL 42202,
at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (detailed affidavit by objecting party overcame expert's
conclusory response).
279. 202 F.R.D. at 430.
280. Id.; see also Nikkal Indus. Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
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Adding a related burden, several courts have insisted that the party seeking
disqualification must show not only that privileges were attached to the
information at issue, but that the claimed confidentiality was not
subsequently waived.28 '
Because disqualification controversies often present factual disputes,
some decisions have, in substance, relied upon a virtual presumption in
cases of ambiguous expert relations.28 2 Thus, when the evidentiary record
does not clearly resolve disputed factual issues about communications
between counsel and the expert concerning the need for confidentiality,
typically the gaps are construed against counsel and disqualification is
denied. 8 3
Thus, in construing ambiguities against counsel and rejecting
disqualification, the court in English Feedlot emphasized that, "a lawyer
seeking to retain an expert and establish a confidential relationship should
make this intention unmistakably clear and should confirm it in writing. 284
Similarly, the court in Wyatt v. Hanan285 observed that, as "repeat players,"
lawyers "know the rules by which everyone must play" and can assure that
a "clear and unambiguous understanding" is established at the outset of any
communication with potential experts. 286 Finding that lawyers must bear
the consequences for misunderstandings or disagreements in close cases,
the court lodged the burden upon counsel, and, presumably, placed a
potential liability in the event that these misunderstandings become costly.
While citing to Wang in holding lawyers accountable for uncertainties,
the district judge in English Feedlot and Wyatt did not refer to that
decision's finding that, "so too must consultants take care to avoid conduct
that contributes to a lack of clarity about the relationship. ' 287 Thus, while

("That burden is not, of course, discharged by mere conclusory or ipse dixit assertions, for any such
rule would foreclose meaningful inquiry into the existence of the relationship and any spurious
claims could never be exposed.") (quoting In re Borianno, 344 F.2d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1965)).
281. English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498,1501-02 (D. Colo. 1993);
Nikkal Indus. Ltd, 689 F. Supp. at 191; see also Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc., 202 F.R.D. at 429;
United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F.
Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997).
282. Wyatt v. Hanan, 871 F. Supp. 415,421-22 (M.D. Ala. 1994); English Feedlot, Inc., 833
F. Supp. at 1501-02; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Hamischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334
(N.D. II1. 1990); Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
283. See Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. I (D.D.C. 1991); see also Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. at 420.
284. 833 F. Supp. at 1505.
285. 871 F. Supp. at 420 ("[A]bsent compelling equitable reasons to the contrary, any
substantial ambiguity regarding whether there is a confidential relationship between an attorney and
an expert should be resolved against the attorney seeking to invoke the relationship.").
286. Id. at 421.
287. For that reason, the courts have insisted that consultants should express unequivocally
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reiterating the need for lawyers to take the lead in minimizing confusion,
the court in Wang had granted disqualification of an expert who could have
avoided conflict of interest problems through his own exercise of greater
care. In fact, Wang found that "silence in the face of receiving this
information reinforces the reasonableness of (the attorney's) assumption
that a confidential relationship existed." 8 Especially because expert
testimony has become a cottage industry where many professionals bring
extensive experience to the highly profitable field of litigation support, the
more even-handed allocation of responsibility advocated in Wang seems
just. As one state court observed, "Deloitte & Touche is in the business of
providing
litigation support and financial consulting services to law
' 28 9
firrns.

Thus, while lawyers are certainly conversant with work-product issues,
virtually all experienced experts-and most disqualification controversies
do not swirl around novices-also know the rules of engagement and are
also able to address any confidentiality problems before any significant
information is exchanged. Thus, the present realities of the expert services
industry may reduce the need for a presumption that largely prefers an
expert's account over an attorney's differing recollection rather than an
even-handed weighing of the credibility ofdiscordant witnesses. While the
presumption against counsel may avoid the need for evidentiary hearings
to resolve conflicting factual accounts, it may not always assure a just
outcome to the controversy.
By rejecting motions that lack a detailed sworn factual predicate, 29 and
construing close cases against counsel, courts have largely avoided
evidentiary hearings on expert-disqualification motions. 29' In fact, even
any doubts about confidentiality obligations. Moreover, in the event that prospective experts are
unwilling to accept confidentiality restraints, they "should decline to accept any disclosures." Wang
Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp. 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1249-50 (E.D. Va. 1991).
288. Id. at 1248. But see Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 90-1477A, 1998 WL 230981, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1998) (an expert's silence does not corroborate
confidentiality absent explicit indications or designated by counsel).
289. Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 702 n. 11 (Ct. App.
1994).
290. Topps Co. v. Productos Stani Sociedad Anomina Industrial y Commercial, No. 99 Civ
9437, 2001 WL 406193, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001). In Topps, the single affidavit stating
"without elaboration" that the challenged expert received "significant disclosures of confidential
information," failed to give an example of "a specific piece of information." Id. The court further
noted that the objecting party opted to rely on the written submissions and did not request an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at *2 n.2.
291. See Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66,67 (D. Md. 1992) (finding "no need for a hearing");
Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 Civ 8898(MEL), 1989 WL 31514,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989); see generallyKoch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d
1178 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no need for an evidentiary hearing); Topps Co., 2001 WL 406193,
at *2 n.2 (evidentiary hearing not requested). But see Nikkal Indus. Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F.
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when factual accounts seemingly differ, courts often avoid the need for live
testimony by, among other things, careful scrutiny and interpretation of the
written submissions. Any omission of specific details is seen as indicating
that no further facts exist, rather than demonstrating a need for an
evidentiary hearing to develop a complete factual record to resolve the
controversy.292 In a similar vein, several decisions have found that a
witness' statement that he or she has no recollection that a conversation
took place is tantamount to acknowledging that the conversation might
have occurred.2 93
XI. ANALYSIS: RECONCILING INHERENT AUTHORITY AND EXPERT
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER PAUL

The virtual consensus among courts embracing the Paul
disqualification doctrine is a compelling validation of a U.S. magistrate's
1988 opinion that transformed the jurisprudence in this critical area. This
overwhelming support confirms not only the need for a consistent
treatment of expert disqualification, but also the positive reaction to Paul's
methodology. In some respects, the Paul doctrine attempts to blend a
disqualification philosophy rooted in judicial disdain toward lawyers who
Supp. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (resolving diverging factual accounts between expert and counsel
through evidentiary hearing before U.S. magistrate). In the event of a hearing, courts may assess
credibility among attorneys and other professionals-a process that was criticized as "unseemly"
by a disappointed litigant, but which may be unavoidable infairly resolving factual controversies.
Id.at 190.
292. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 230981, at *3 ("Testimony that one does

not recall an event is not testimony that the event did not happen."); see also Michelson, 1989 WL
31514, at *5 (finding that evidentiary hearing was unnecessary; expert "did not flatly deny having
received such information; he only stated that he did not remember any"); Shadow Traffic Network
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 ("[Tlhe failure to recollect is pregnant with the concession that the event
in question may in fact have occurred but that the declarant has no immediate memory of it.").
293. Disqualification appeals follow traditional criteria. Hanlon v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 191 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nikkal Indus. Ltd., 689 F. Supp. at 189-90
(magistrate's report adopted unless clearly erroneous or contrary to law and apply abuse of
discretion standards in appeals); Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 903 (D.C. 1997); City of
Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). However, prior to final
judgment, extraordinary remedies might be considered. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d
1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("However, a writ of mandamus 'may be sought to prevent the
wrongful exposure of privileged communications."'). "In general, a mandamus petitioner must
establish that the right to the writ is clear and undisputable ... and that it lacks adequate alternative
means to obtain the relief sought." Id.; see also In re Am. Airlines, Inc. 972 F.2d 605,607-08 (5th
Cir. 1992) (exceptional circumstances warrant mandamus requiring disqualification of former
counsel representing antitrust competitor); B-C Hous. P'ship, L.P. v. Apollo Ltd. P'ship, Nos.
A096780, A096583, 2002 WL 31628763, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002) (finding order of
disqualification remarkable as either injunction or as a final order on a collateral matter). An
erroneous ruling concerning expert disqualification can also result in reversal of a jury verdict.
Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765 (Va. 2001).
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switch loyalties, with a proper recognition that experts are witnesses who
should not be regulated by the attorney's ethical rules.29 4
Simply stated, the Paul disqualification doctrine has won almost
universal acceptance because it is appealing and workable. But its
popularity does not alter the fact that it is ajudicial creation rather than an
application of statutory authority. Nor does its seeming efficacy change the
fact that the Paulcourt's notion of inherent power has lived a separate life
from the Supreme Court's own criteria. Therefore, while Paul and its
progeny rely explicitly upon this power source for disqualification, they
fail to discuss Supreme Court decisions that, during the last decade, have
circumscribed the parameters of inherent authority. Those Supreme Court
decisions should not be side-stepped based on lower courts' enthusiasm for
the practical methodology of Paul. Indeed, especially in the absence of
governing rules, lower courts are not liberated from the definitional
doctrine promulgated by the nation's highest court.
To date, none of the Court's inherent power decisions has expressly
endorsed the judicial prerogative of disqualifying expert witnesses based
on conflicts of interest. While the warrant conferred upon courts to
"manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
'
disposition of cases"295
could arguably be read to envelop conflicted
experts, Supreme Court decisions to date have not mandated this type of
extension. Expert disqualification is, after all, an exclusion of evidence that
inflicts a harsh consequence upon the litigant. Even if never denominated
as a "sanction," the impact of disqualification is tantamount to a punitive
order striking that expert. In prior Court decisions, judicial erasures have
been the result of a litigant's transgressions, like dismissal of an action for
failure to prosecute, 6 barring a disruptive defendant from the

294. Further complicating the disqualification framework for experts is the reality that while
ostensibly independent, expert witnesses are increasingly viewed in practical terms as an integral
part of the legal team. While courts continue to characterize them as witnesses contributing
specialized knowledge for the benefit of the trier of fact, most courtroom duels with top trial experts
seemingly defy any thesis that experts are not advocates. E.g., Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways
(In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982), 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating that some experts "become nothing more than an advocate of policy before thejury"). Other
courts have been even more blunt. Va. Tech Found. Inc. v. Family Group Ltd., 666 F. Supp. 856,
858 (W.D. Va. 1987) ("(T)he hired guns did what they were hired to do."); Clement v. Griffin, 634
So. 2d 412, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (It is "almost common knowledge that many experts were
available to the highest bidder; in other words, they will testify favorably to whomever pays for
their services."); State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (There is
widespread concern about the use of "mercenary" experts because they are "likely to be a greater
hindrance to a fair trial than a biased lay witness.").
295. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 40 (1991) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
296. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
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297

or assessing attorney's fees as a sanction for bad-faith
In contradistinction, disqualification under the Paul doctrine,
another potentially devastating blow to the litigant, is allowable even in the
absence of a violation of court orders or finding of bad faith.
Especially in light of the admonition in Degen that "these powers must
be delimited with care, for there is danger of overreaching,"2 99 the lower
courts' extension of inherent power to the province of expert
disqualification, without the preconditions for intervention proscribed by
the Court itself, is a remarkable innovation. While this initiative is
understandable, it should not be insulated from the restraints prescribed in
Chambersand Degen.
Thus, because disqualification is truly a drastic remedy that necessarily
impedes, in varying degrees, the normal process for bringing relevant
evidence to the trier of fact, complete elimination should not be imposed
under inherent authority unless bad faith is found. While such a limitation
could occasionally countenance unseemly expert engagements, several
realities safeguard against substantial prejudice. Indeed, bad faith is a
settled predicate for enforcing inherent powers, fully consonant with the
teachings of the Supreme Court.3" Additionally, if recognized privileges
are violated by the actions of a side-switching expert, courts are already
empowered to protect against privilege violations through injunctions and
other recognized sanctions without needlessly loosening the reins that grip
inherent authority.
Along with confining outright disqualification to the predicates
recognized in Link and Chambers,future applications should also adhere
to the duty to invoke alternative remedies. As was highlighted in Degen,
"a federal court has at its disposal an array of means," and "the existence
of these alternative means ... shows the lack of necessity for the harsh
sanction." '' Certainly, through a combination of limiting judicial
directives30 2 and aggressive cross-examination, 0 3 any potential harm can
be sharply reduced, and even eliminated. For example, in all events, courts
can prohibit challenged experts from disclosing any confidences gained
courtroom,
conduct.2 9

297. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
298. Chambers,501 U.S. at 44-45.
299. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
300. A district court noted "that the jilted party is not without a remedy against the faithless
expert, since the party may pursue a claim in contract." Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1086 n.l I (C.D. Cal. 2001).
301. Degen, 517 U.S. at 827.
302. Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., City of N.Y., 176 F.R.D. 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Space Sys./Loral v. Martin Marietta Corp., Civ. No. 95-20122 SW, 1995 WL 686369 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 15, 1995).
303. Stencel, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
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from prior engagements. 3° Moreover, to avoid potential for an unfair
discrediting of the original client's position, courts have ruled that the
challenged expert may not identify the prior engagement during
testimony,30 5 even while allowing counsel to cross-examine them to expose
any inconsistencies. 3 6 As with any confrontation with a skilled witness,
cross-examination of an expert who had prior contact with an adversary
can be perilous. 30 7 Nonetheless, in weighing the trade-off between
excluding relevant evidence as opposed to heightening the challenges for
counsel-challenges that likely could have been prevented in the first
instance-the outcome is manifest.
XII. CONCLUSION

A faithful application of the Supreme Court's doctrine to expertconflict controversies may almost never yield disqualification and will
further test judicial resourcefulness in fashioning alternative safeguards.
But those principles of inherent authority better serve the policies that
welcome evidence when it is truly relevant and competent. Indeed, with the
Court's intensified scrutiny of the reliability of expert testimony,308 the

304. Cf Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 126 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
305. Cf Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (1 th Cir. 1996):
Once a witness has been designated as expected to testify at trial, there may be
situations when the witness should be permitted to testify for the opposing party.
In such situations, however, we believe that a party should not generally be
permitted to establish that the witness had been previously retained by the
opposing party.
Id. (footnote omitted).
306. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01C6157,2002 WL 653893, at *4 (N.D.
II1.Apr. 19,2002); Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 451-454; Donovan v. Bowling, 706 A.2d 937 (R.I. 1998).
307. In Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 451, the court, quoting Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243
(Ariz. 1982), stated:
If the plaintiff sought to attack the expert's qualifications or credentials, he might
well have some concern that the defendant would attempt to rehabilitate the
witness by showing that plaintiffs counsel had thought well enough ofthe witness
to consult him on this very case .... Further, he might be put in the position of
having to impeach the expert's testimony by showing it differed in some material
way from statements made in the report that the same consultant had made to
plaintiff's counsel .... Cross-examination is a difficult art which is not made
easier when counsel must perform it on a tightrope.
Id.
308. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ("[U]nder the Rules the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
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need to allow expert analysis that has been properly validated to reach the
fact-finder is all the more clear. While, in most instances, this vehicle for
expert disqualification has functioned adequately over the past decade, it
is time for a more enduring treatment. 3° If a broad range of factors
overwhelm judicial efforts to contain any fall-out from conflicted experts,
courts could look to the explicitly conferred authority under Fed. R. Evid.
403 to balance the probative value against unfair prejudice or confusion of
the issues. 31" The promulgation of a rule, though, to prescribe criteria for
conflict-based disqualification would address not only substantive
standards, but also the procedure for determining which disputes must be
litigated. Moreover, in addition to settling any lingering tension between
the earlier attorney-based analogies of Conforti and the actual prejudice
focus of Paul and its progeny, procedural rules could address the current
one-sided presumptions that overwhelmingly favor experts in any factual
controversies with counsel.
In the event an expert-disqualification rule were to be fashioned, few
would advocate wholesale incorporation of attorney-client criteria due to
the core differences between lawyer advocacy and expert testimony. 31'
Even so, because the conflict issue has ordinarily centered upon the impact
of a prior engagement, the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11
embodies several concepts that are critical to expert-disqualification
analysis. In addressing successive government and private employment; the
threshold for conflict under Rule 1.11 is not imputed or derived
participation in the same matter,312 but rather personal and substantial
participation, a theme that is also manifested in most expertdisqualification cases. In the event that this standard is met, the rule
nonetheless allows others in the firm to participate so long as the

309. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (stating that when sanctionable
conduct is within the scope of the rules of civil procedure, the court ordinarily should rely on the
Rules rather than inherent power); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,254 (1988)
(finding that inherent supervisory power does not circumvent FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); see also
Societe International Pour Participations Industrielles et Commercials, S.A. v. Rogers. 357 U.S.
197, 206 (1958) (inherent authority should defer to FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
310. FED.R.EviD.403.
311. See supra notes 188, 195, 198, and accompanying citations and discussion.
312. "Matter" is defined as follows:
(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes:
(1) Any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other
determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation,
arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and
(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate
government agency.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.1 (d) (2003).
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disqualified individual is screened from any further participation and
written notice is promptly given to the former client." 3 Although no
analogy to attorney-client standards could be perfect, the balanced
methodology of Rule 1.11 could be, like other analogous provisions,3 1 4 a
useful starting point for any effort to create a rule for expert
disqualification.
Even more fundamentally though, the proper focus for the parties, their
counsel, and the experts must be to avoid expert conflicts; disputes which,
with rare exceptions, are eminently preventable. Early on, the court in
Wang suggested questioning the expert about past employment to ascertain
possible conflicts before proceeding with any discussions of confidential
information. Other safeguards designated in Wang include advance
explanations of any confidentiality issues, the deferral of disclosures until
any ambiguities are resolved, the need for consultants and attorneys to raise
questions in the event of any doubt, and the advisability of documenting
any understandings with respect to prospective services and the use of any
information being exchanged." 5
Moreover, while recognizing the role of experts as valuable sources of
information in numerous fields of knowledge, the court nonetheless found
that as participants in the adversary process, they too have a key role in
averting conflict scenarios. Just as the court reminded lawyers of their
obligation to inform consultants about the confidentiality of their
relationships,3" 6 the Wang decision also allocated a corresponding
responsibility to experts:
Just as lawyers must avoid ambiguity in the retention process,
so too must consultants take care to avoid conduct that

313. Id. R. 1.11 provides, in part, that:
(b). [N]o lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly
undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
314. For example, the conflict of interest restrictions governing former federal officers and
employees, which encompass criminal sanctions and employ a range of safeguards, including time
restrictions, 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2003) (certain former officers prohibited from dealing with
agency for two years); id. § 207(b) (one year post-termination prohibition with respect to certain
activities where former officer or employee had "access" to relevant information), and, in limited
circumstances, permanent restrictions for certain matters "in which the person participated
personally and substantially." Id. § 207(a)(1).
315. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248-49 (E.D. Va 1991).
316. Id. at 1248.
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contributes to a lack of clarity about the relationship. If a
consultant has doubts that she or he wants to be retained,
those doubts should be unequivocally expressed. Such
consultants should decline to accept any disclosures.32 7
of
Thus, as litigants have been pointedly reminded, the "costly litigation
318
collateral issues concerning expert disqualification can be avoided.
Accordingly, while the Paul disqualification doctrine has achieved
remarkable acceptance, its support is based more on the persuasive force
of its moderate message than the depth of its pre-existing legal foundation.
Thus, so long as its prescription for preventative measures is chronically
ignored, the need continues for analytical foundations with the firmest
possible footings. Even without new rule-making, certainty and clarity in
the increasingly crucial and fractious domain of expert testimony is
furthered by bringing expert disqualification in line with Supreme Court
holdings that elevate the truth-seeking mission of all courts.

317. Id.at 1250.
318. In English Feedlot,Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1505 (D. Colo. 1993),
the articulation of the problem-avoidance proposals included a summary adopted from Wang:
First, a lawyer seeking to retain an expert and establish a confidential relationship
should make this intention unmistakably clear and should confirm it in writing.
The writing should define clearly the consultant's confidentiality obligation. If a
consultant does not want to be bound by such confidentiality requirement, he
should decline the engagement. Similarly, counsel seeking to retain a consultant
should inquire specifically whether the consultant's past employment presents any
confidentiality problems.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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